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Landfill gas (LFG) projects use the gas created from decomposing waste, which is 
approximately 49% methane, and substitute it for natural gas in engines, boilers, 
turbines, and other technologies to produce energy or heat.  The projects are 
beneficial in terms of increased safety at the landfill, production of a cost-effective 
source of energy or heat, reduced odor, reduced air pollution emissions, and reduced 
greenhouse gas emissions.  However, landfills sometimes face conflicting policy 
incentives.  The theory of technical change shows that the diffusion of a technology 
or groups of technologies increases slowly in the beginning and then picks up speed 
as knowledge and better understanding of using the technology diffuses among 
potential users.  Using duration analysis, data on energy prices,  State and Federal 
policies related to landfill gas, renewable energy, and air pollution, as well as control 
data on landfill characteristics, I estimate the influence and direction of influence of 
renewable portfolio standards (RPS).  The analysis found that RPS positively 
  
influences the diffusion of landfill gas technologies, encouraging landfills to consider 
electricity generation projects over direct sales of LFG to another facility.  Energy 
price increases or increased revenues for a project are also critical.  Barriers to 
diffusion include air emission permits in non-attainment areas and policies, such as 
net metering, which promote other renewables over LFG projects.  Using the 
estimates from the diffusion equations, I analyze the potential influence of a Federal 
RPS as well as the potential interaction with a Federal, market based climate change 
policy, which will increase the revenue of a project through higher energy sale prices.  
My analysis shows that a market based climate change policy such as a cap-and-trade 
or carbon tax scheme would increase the number of landfill gas projects significantly 
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CO2 Carbon Dioxide 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Over the last decade, many policy analysts have focused on national and international 
activity (or lack thereof) on climate change and renewable energy policy.  Significant 
activity at the State level has overshadowed the focus on what is not being done by 
the Federal government on climate change and has limited progress at the Federal 
level to promote alternative sources of fuel.  The focus of policy analysis on State 
climate change initiatives has increased due to expanded media attention and the 
establishment of regional initiatives led by progressive states such as California.  
According to Barry Rabe of the PEW Center on Global Climate Change, 
“Collectively, they [State policies] constitute a diverse set of policy innovations rich 
with lessons for the next generation of American climate change policy.”1  
The focus of this dissertation is to study the influence of current environmental 
policies on reducing greenhouse gases through encouraging or discouraging the use 
of greenhouse gas reduction technologies.  Specifically, this study looks at the affect 
of renewable energy policies on the diffusion of methane capture-and-use 
technologies in the landfill sector.  Identifying the obstacles, as well as the incentives 
to landfill gas projects, is a key element to designing and implementing a successful 
future climate change policy.     
Air emission issues in the US were addressed first at the State level before becoming 
Federal regulations.2  States provide laboratories for various policies to enable the 
Federal government to address issues and which later provide it with the ability to 
analyze effects of specific policies before they become regulations and to choose 
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from a diverse menu of options already tried at the State level.  One of the most 
widely used State level tools to reduce climate change and encourage renewable 
energy production is the renewable portfolio standard (RPS).3    The states provide 
data and a basis for analysis to determine whether or not a Federal RPS is feasible and 
desirable.   
Landfill gas is a key sector for any climate change policy, whether the focus is 
increasing energy from renewable sources or reducing direct emissions of a 
greenhouse gas.  Landfills are the largest emitter of methane, a greenhouse gas 23 
times more potent than carbon dioxide (CO2) in trapping heat in the atmosphere.  It is 
also a sector where reduction technologies are a known quantity.  The capture-and-
use of methane can generate enough revenue to cover the cost of the reductions, 
making reductions in the sector significantly cheaper than reductions in CO2.   
Landfills also provide a cheaper source of renewable energy than wind farms or solar 
installations. 
Despite some success with the RPS, states are now considering, or are in the process 
of implementing, other climate change policies such as cap-and-trade programs.  In 
the absence of a climate policy and, in some cases, the absence of an RPS, many 
landfills in the US currently run landfill gas projects.  These projects are 
economically viable because the gas they recover can be sold as energy.  However, 
experts agree that there are a significant amount of projects, an estimated 600 
landfills, that are economically viable but that are not being implemented.   Several 
theories have been forward as to why this occurs, including information constraints, 
conflicting and confusing policy environments, and problems securing energy sales.  
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The continued presence of these problems could hinder the effectiveness and 
potentially raise the cost of a climate change policy in the future. 
Identifying and understanding the current incentives and disincentives to technology 
adoption in the landfill gas sector is critical to understanding the response of the 
sector to a climate change policy.  Several studies on climate modeling4 5 state that 
climate policy will induce technical change, both innovation and the diffusion of 
technologies, based on the past experience of other environmental policies.  
Proponents of this theory point to empirical studies correlating technology change to 
non-climate change environmental policies and higher energy prices as evidence of a 
future climate policy’s ability to significantly induce technology change.  What they 
do not consider in any of these meta-analyses is the current effect of environmental 
policies in both the energy and non-energy sectors of the economy and the potential 
for distortion of the policies when a climate change regime is imposed on top of the 
current policy structure. 
The majority, if not all, of empirical studies that estimate rates of technical change or 
the effects of policies on induced technical change have also focused exclusively on 
the energy sector, changes in either the supply of or the demand for energy.  These 
studies often refer to the energy shock of the 1970s or energy related environmental 
policies such as appliance standards, air quality policies, or energy taxes.   Little has 
been done to evaluate the potential effect of a climate policy on technical change in 
non-energy sectors, yet reduction technologies for non- CO2 greenhouse gases such as 
methane, have been implemented for over a decade. 6 7 8  These technologies are 
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particularly important to study because the diffusion of these technologies is assumed 
to be able to reduce the cost of a climate change policy by 30 to 60 percent.9 10    
The Setting 
Methane from municipal solid waste (MSW) facilities is the largest human-generated 
source of methane emissions in the US, releasing 135 million metric tons of CO2 
equivalents (MMTCO2E) in 2003, with approximately 116 MMTCO2E captured-and-
used, flared, or oxidized.11 Landfill gas is created through an anaerobic process where 
bacteria in decomposing garbage generate methane and other organic compounds.  
Landfill gas is approximately 49 percent methane and, therefore, a valuable energy 
resource.   
Table. 1: Emissions from Landfills in MMTCO2E
12  
(million metric tones of CO2 equivalent) 
 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
MSW 
Landfills 
188.7 204.7 217.3 221.4 227.2 234.9 242.4 249.6 
Industrial 
Landfills 
12.9 13.9 15.4 15.6 1537 15.9 16.0 16.1 
Recovered         
Gas-to-
Energy 
(17.6) (22.3) (49.0) (54.3) (54.4) (54.9) (57.1) (58.6) 
Flared (5.0) (21.8) (37.1) (40.8) (43.7) (46.0) (54.4) (60.4) 
Oxidized (17.9) (17.5) (14.7) (14.2) (14.5) (15.0) (14.7) (14.7) 
Total 161.0 157.1 131.9 127.6 130.4 134.9 132.1 132.0 
Source: USEPA, 2007; Note: parentheses denote reductions in emissions. 
Net methane emissions are increasing in the US.  Estimates of methane oxidization, 
flaring, and use as energy are increasing over time, helping to counteract increases in 
waste disposal and methane generation rates.  The largest source of the reductions is 
attributed to the New Source Performance Standard (NSPS), also called the Landfill 
Rule.  The Landfill Rule is an air pollution reduction requirement that mandates 
landfills that emit 50 mega grams (Mg) or more per year of non-methane volatile 
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organic carbons (NMVOCs) to begin collecting landfill gas and flaring the gas.13  
This also destroys the methane in the landfill gas.  The number of gas-to-energy 
projects is increasing, and it is theorized that the number of landfills that trigger the 
Federal Landfill Rule is also increasing.14    
The total number of landfill gas projects has increased significantly from 50 projects 
in 1986 to 350 in 2003.15  Today, 424 of landfills have gas recovery projects, while 
500 landfills flare the gas instead of venting it into the atmosphere.16    Total energy 
recovered has increased from 371 million metric tons of methane or tera grams (Tg) 
of methane to 1212 million metric tons.  Total energy flared has increased from 210 
million metric tons of methane to 1466 million metric tons over the same time period.   
Benefits of Landfill Gas Projects 
According to US Environmental Protection Agency’s (USEPA) Landfill Methane 
Outreach Program (LMOP) literature, there are several motivations for installing 
landfill gas recovery and use projects: 
 Methane can be used to offset the use of a non-renewable fossil fuel (coal, oil, 
natural gas); 
 Projects help reduce local air pollution by also destroying non-methane 
organic compounds that create smog in local areas; 
 Projects create revenues for local landfills or reduce costs of environmental 
compliance, particularly as natural gas and electricity prices rise; and 
 Projects reduce safety risk from fires and explosions due to migration of 
methane in the landfill. 
 Landfill policies generally focus on potential environmental benefits.  Landfills are 
highly regulated for their environmental impact since they can potentially harm water 
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quality, soils, and air quality.  The benefits of landfill gas projects are primarily air 
quality benefits. 
Reduction of Greenhouse Gases 
Greenhouse gases allow incoming solar radiation to pass through the atmosphere and 
reach the earth, but they absorb the infrared radiation that is re-emitted from the 
ground. This keeps the heat (radiation) trapped in the atmosphere instead of releasing 
it into space, creating a “greenhouse” effect.  
Each greenhouse gas has a different 
impact on global warming, based on 
its effectiveness in absorbing 
radiation and its lifetime in the 
atmosphere. Methane traps 23 times 
more radiation than CO2.  The 
potencies of greenhouse gases are 
compared using a global warming potential (GWP) index. The GWP of a gas is an 
index relative to CO2 , comparing the warming contribution of a kg of CO2 compared 
to a kg of the indexed gas. The GWPs of greenhouse gases vary widely, ranging from 
23 times to 22,200 times more potent than CO2.
17  Table 2 above summarizes the 
GWPs of the major greenhouse gases. 
Methane (CH4) is an important greenhouse gas.   Methane emissions account for 
approximately 9 percent of all greenhouse gas emissions in the US.  The largest 
methane sources in the US include: landfills (33 percent of total anthropogenic 
Table 2: Examples of Global Warming Potentials 
Gas Lifetime GWP 
Carbon Dioxide (CO2) 50-120 years 1 
Methane (CH4) 12 23 
Nitrous Oxide (N2O) 114 296 
HFC- 143a 52 4,300 
CF4 50,000 5,700 
SF6 3,200 22,200 
Source: IPCC Third Assessment Report, 2001 
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methane emissions in the US); livestock enteric fermentation (20 percent); leakage 
from oil production and natural gas production, processing, and 
transmission/distribution (19 percent); coal mining (10 percent); and livestock 
manure management (6 percent).18 
Air Pollution Reductions 
Landfill gas contains volatile organic compounds (VOCs) and nitrogen oxides (NOx).  
VOCs and NOx are precursors to the formation of ground level ozone and smog.  
Ozone is a criteria air pollutant and can have an adverse effect on respiratory health, 
including reduced lung function and aggravation of asthma.  Ground-level ozone (O3) 
is not emitted, but it is formed through the chemical reaction of its precursors in 
sunlight.19  Recent studies have suggested that controlling methane, particularly at 
landfills, is an effective way of reducing local, background ozone as well as 
tropospheric ozone formation. 20  Local air quality strategies have previously focused 
on the shorter-lived more reactive precursors to ozone, such as NOx and Non-
Methane Volatile Organic Compounds (NMVOCs).  However, more recent work 
suggests that methane may also quickly lead to significant reductions in ozone.21 
Safety Benefits 
Methane mitigation also addresses safety concerns surrounding the migration of 
landfill gas and the high potential for landfill fires fueled by landfill gas.  Establishing 
a system of wells during the design and filling of a landfill cell safely collects landfill 





Non- CO2 greenhouse gases like methane are unlikely to be directly regulated under a 
climate change policy.22  Most legislation that has been proposed in the US focuses 
on capping CO2 emissions from utilities, which can then buy “offsets” from other 
sectors such as landfills.  The appeal of this scheme is that utilities could buy cheaper 
reductions from other sectors, lowering the overall cost of the regulation.  However, if 
landfills would have reduced their methane emissions without a climate policy in 
place, then these “offsets” would not be real reductions in total greenhouse gas 
emissions.  If the reductions would have taken place without the climate policy, the 
reductions would be “anyway tons” (tons that would have been reduced without the 
policy) and should not be counted as a reduction under the climate change policy.  
Understanding what the diffusion rate is in the absence of a climate policy would 
determine the amount available for offsets and, in turn, the true cost of meeting a 
greenhouse gas target. 
The US landfill gas sector is an important case study in how non-climate change 
environmental regulations may affect the outcome of a stringent climate change 
policy.  Many developing countries are starting to manage their waste through a 
system of landfills, moving away from the open dumping that is currently prevalent.  
Developing countries are also starting to enact some of the same air quality and 
renewable energy polices as the US and the EU in attempt to reduce smog and 
increase access to energy, particularly in their poorer populations.  Understanding the 
role of air quality and renewable energy policies in inducing technical change in the 
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US landfill gas sector will help understand the barriers to implementing landfill gas 
projects in other countries. 
Objectives 
The objective of this study is to try to determine the effects of State level renewable 
energy policies on technology change in the landfill gas sector, as well as Federal 
renewable energy policies, air quality policies, and energy prices while controlling for 
the individual characteristics of the landfills.  The end result will be estimates of the 
effect of these policies on the diffusion of technologies and the choice of technologies 
used in landfill gas projects.     The basic concepts behind what drives technical 
change are introduced in Chapters 2, and Chapter 3 reviews the methodology used to 
estimate technical change in this thesis.  Chapters 4 and 5 analyze rates of diffusion 
and technology choice, respectively.  Chapter 6 analyzes the potential policy 
implications of these estimations.  Finally, Chapter 7 reviews the relevance of this 





Chapter 2: Review of Basic Concepts 
Diffusion is the process by which a technology spreads among individuals or firms in 
an economy.23  Diffusion of technology has many aspects, including the speed and 
variation of diffusion, variations in the rates of acceptance of different types of 
technologies by similar firms, and the acceptance of innovative processes, including 
those technologies which “spillover” from other countries, sectors, and the like. 
The concepts of technological diffusion and technological learning have been widely 
used since their introduction by economist Edwin Mansfield.24 Empirical studies of 
diffusion (adoption over time of a technology) have focused on the speed in the 
diffusion, the choice between technologies, the variation in acceptance of 
technologies, and the characteristics of the technologies and adopters that explain the 
speed and acceptance of one technology over another.  Mansfield produced the 
seminal work in the area of technology diffusion.  His work on the diffusion of 
robotics showed a firm’s perceived adoption costs, rate of return, and the risk 
associated with technology investments.25  His framework used the general premise 
that technical information diffuses throughout an industry (or industries) and reduces 
costs.  The standard adoption curve is an S-shaped distribution, where adoption is 
slow at first, accelerates as it spreads through the population, and then slows as the 
market becomes saturated.26  The shape of the curve has been empirically tested using 
a variety of statistical techniques and is considered the standard.  This curve 
represents not only the firms’ decision whether or not to adopt, but also their choice 
between adopting now or deferring adoption until another time period.27 
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Diffusion policy or policies that encourage the diffusion of specific technologies or 
sets of technologies are widely used in the US.  Until recently, most policy regimes 
have focused on the encouragement of invention and innovation through public 
research and development (R&D), grants, and subsidies.  This also reflects the 
literature on the subject.28  Only a small number of studies have focused on the 
success of policies in the diffusion of technologies.   
Theoretical Factors Influencing Adoption and Technology Choice 
Economists and sociologists form the two schools of thought on variables affecting 
technology diffusion.  While the two schools focus their attention on separate issues, 
discounting the concerns of the other school, most of the factors that influence 
diffusion are considered as relevant by both schools and overlap.  Economists 
consider more than just financial variables, and sociologists consider economic 
factors in their analyses.  For the purpose of the following discussion, the two schools 
are separated, even though the variables considered are the same in many cases.  For 
this study, variables from both schools are considered in the analysis.   
Sociological Factors 
Sociologists assume that money making is not the primary goal of an adopter, even if 
it is considered part of the decision making process.  The sociologists’ school of 
thought focuses on adoption as a social process, where the decision-maker and the 
decision process are the key to understanding diffusion.  Within this process, 
decisions are based not only on the characteristics of the firm (the decision-maker), 
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but also on how the decision-maker evaluates technology, social networks, and the 
social and cultural environment in which the decision-maker acts. 
The theoretical backbone of the sociologists’ theory is described as a multi-stage 
process where social and individual factors play different roles at different stages in 
the adoption process.  The stages of diffusion can be summarized as a five stage 
dynamic process: 
1. Knowing that the technology exists and that its application is relevant to the 
decision-maker; 
2. Non-trial evaluation of the technology or the stage where the decision-maker 
begins to collect information which may or may not lead to an actual trial of 
the technology; 
3. Small-scale or full-scale trial evaluation of the technology; 
4. Adoption of the technology on a full scale; and 
5. Non-adoption or dis-adoption of a technology because results from the trial 
are not encouraging. 29  
Within this dynamic process, several key characteristics play a role in influencing 
adoption.  In particular, the characteristics of the technology itself, the firm’s 
characteristics, and social and cultural norms are influential within the framework. 
 Technology Characteristics 
Several criteria exist for deciding whether or not to adopt a technology.  If one of 
these criteria is not met, creating a barrier to adoption, the decision-maker will not 
adopt the technology. 30  The first criterion is the performance of the technology, 
which relates to the benefits or the revenue generated by the technology, as well as 
the engineering efficiency.  The second is the cost of the technology in terms of fixed 
costs, operation and maintenance costs, opportunity costs, and training costs, as well 
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as other costs born by the company when a specific technology is chosen.  The third 
is the consumer acceptance of the technology, which also includes acceptance by the 
consumer of the final product but may also include the community’s acceptance as a 
whole.  The fourth is the safety of using the technology.  The fifth is the enabling 
infrastructure for the technology, or how well the technology works with the 
technologies or infrastructure the company already has in place.  The sixth is whether 
or not the technology always compels the firm to comply with the current or foreseen 
regulatory environment.  The last is the environmental impact of the technology, 
which is also related to the regulatory structure of the industry and consumer 
acceptance.   
E. M. Rogers, an economist at Stanford University, lists five categories that influence 
the adaptors decision-making related to technologies.31  These include:   
1. The relative advantage of the innovation;  
2. The compatibility with current technology used by the adaptor and with social 
norms;  
3. The complexity of the technology, (relating to cost, complementary 
investment, relative advantage, and the benefit/cost ratio of adopting a new 
technology);  
4. The ease of testing the technology; and  
5. The ease of observing and evaluated the technology.   
Some of these criteria overlap with the industry decision-maker criteria above, 
particularly the relative advantage of the technology, its compatibility with current 
technology, and the cost of the technology.  But, Rogers’ focus is not only on specific 
criteria used in the evaluation of the technology.  He also stresses the ease of 
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evaluating the technology, suggesting that even the best of technologies will not be 
adopted unless the technologies can be easily tested or demonstrated on a large scale.    
Landfill gas technologies are a special case in the sense that they are developed for 
another sector, tried and tested in other sectors, and then adapted to the landfill gas 
sector.  The complexity of potential landfill gas technologies varies.  The 
reciprocating engine is the most understood, and newer technologies like fuel cells 
are the least understood by the industry.  Testing of the technology occurs in the 
primary sector where the early adaptor in the form of developer or company can 
observe and evaluate the technology for the landfill gas sector.  Evaluation of the 
technology is generally easy (the technology usually is not a new technology), but 
using the technology in the landfill gas sector is a new use for an old technology.  If 
the technology seems suitable for use with landfill gas, the technology becomes a 
spillover; and the first use of the technology in the landfill gas sector occurs.  Then 
the diffusion becomes an intra-sectoral spillover.  The relative advantages of the 
technology, as defined above, then determine the adoption pattern. 
Many, including Rogers, assume that technologies don’t change over time and that 
the new technology is always better than the old.  Nathan Rosenberg, another 
economist from Stanford University who has written extensively about diffusion of 
technologies, challenges this.  He argues that technologies improve with user 
experience and that competitive pressure could actually boost the improvement of an 
old technology and slow the diffusion of the new technology. 32   This argument may 
hold true in the landfill gas sector.  User experience in the primary sector may mean 
that landfill owners are more likely to adopt the old technology because more is 
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understood about issues relating to the adaptation of the technology to landfill gas.  
Experience with and improvements in an old technology may provide significant 
advantages over a newer, lesser-known technology in the eyes of the landfill 
owner/operator. 
 Firm Specific Characteristics 
Many empirical studies of technology diffusion have incorporated information on 
firms as a factor in the diffusion patterns.  Firm heterogeneity is considered a major 
factor in the “uneven” diffusion of a given technology.  A firm’s characteristics 
reflect the firm’s ability to “take-up” a technology available to them.   However, it 
should be noted that technology change is a dynamic process; the firm’s 
heterogeneity not only influences technology adoption, but it is also influenced by 
past technology adoption patterns.   
An empirical study on diffusion of multiple technologies concluded that the variables 
traditionally considered in the literature on diffusion are confirmed by their study of 
flexible automation in the Italian metal working industry. 33  Plant size, type of 
production, use of the technology is the same geographic region, interdependencies, 
and cumulative learning-by-using effects were the key determinants of a plant’s 
adoption behavior.  The study points out that the experience a plant gained by using 
previously available technologies is crucial to the adoption of the new technology.  
The conclusion of the study states that individual innovations should not be studied in 
isolation.  The authors note that heterogeneity in firms is endogenous to the diffusion 
process; in other words, firms are different because of their adoption decisions.   
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Additionally, Rogers considers four firm-specific issues other than firm size and 
plant-type that may affect the ease of adoption. 34  These include: who makes the 
decision to adopt, how information is acquired about a technology, the norms in the 
adaptor’s social system, and the extent to which the sellers can efficiently promote the 
technology within the sector.  Again, these variables are not always clearly 
distinguishable from each other.  Firm size, for instance, may be correlated with the 
decision structure within the firm and how information is required.  Social or cultural 
norms within the society may also correlate with plant-type.    
 Social and Cultural Factors 
Evaluation of a technology or project may be influenced by the society in which the 
decision-maker lives.  Most economic text books explain the relationship between 
increases in aggregate income and education levels and increased environmental 
protection.  However, several studies have gone beyond the income and education 
variables and looked at the decision-maker's role within society and society’s 
attitudes towards economic activity in the sector.   
A literature review covering the various influences of the adoption of conservation 
technology in the farming sector summarized a handful of journal articles into four 
relevant factors in the evaluation of information by the decision maker (in this case, 
the rural landholder). 35  The factors were: material wealth and financial security; 
environmental protection and enhancement beyond that related to person financial 
gain; social approval and acceptance; and personal integrity and high ethical 
standards. Two of the categories relate directly to the social norms of the society and 
the individual.    
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Another example of social norms and their influence on adoption can be found in a 
study of the diffusion of organic horticultural practices in the UK.36  The study uses 
the physical characteristics of the farm, the characteristics of the farmer, current 
farming techniques, farm level economic indicators, the farmer’s sources of 
information, membership in associations, and attitudes towards environmental issues 
as explanatory variables for diffusion.  The study found that the gender of the farmer 
was of particular importance. However, the belief that environmental concerns and 
sustainability of food system were important also meant that adoption was more 
likely.  The study confirmed the importance of non-economic factors, particularly 
attitudes, on diffusion.  At the same time, the study found negative results (e.g., that 
education and income did not affect the time taken to adopt).  
While there is obviously a difference between a family run farm and a landfill run by 
a large waste management company or a local government, there are commonalities 
which have not been researched.  In particular, there are two areas of interest in the 
above studies that apply to landfills.  The first is the existence of social networks 
within the landfill industry, and the second is the attitude towards greenhouse gas 
issues.   
The existence of social networks in the case of landfills is in the form of Solid Waste 
Association of North America (SWANA) or the LMOP program, where each 
association actively promotes the use of landfill gas as a fuel source.  Both 
organizations hold up examples of continued successful and financially profitable 
examples of landfill gas recovery projects as examples of profit making, 
environmentally friendly decisions to spur the interest of other landfills.  This may 
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have a large impact on the way landfill management views landfill gas projects.  
There are also the relationships among landfills within a particular geographic area 
and the potential for the diffusion of information through these relationships, by 
word-of-mouth.  This diffusion of knowledge, whether passively obtained or directed 
towards landfills through an information programs like LMOP or SWANA, may be 
an important factor contributing to the increase in number of landfill gas recovery 
projects and may promote better operation of the technologies.    
Increasing public awareness of climate change concerns, whether associated with 
landfill gas directly or as overall awareness of climate change increase, may increase 
the likelihood that projects are implemented.  In areas where environmental concerns 
in general and climate change concerns specifically are considered high priority, such 
as California, landfill gas projects may diffusion more quickly.  While higher 
awareness may influence government and firm decision-making, no concrete 
evidence of this exists. 
Economic Factors 
While sociologists and organizational behaviorists focus on the external environment, 
economists favor the approach of rational behavior by a series of individuals based on 
the incremental benefits of adopting a new technology against the cost of adopting 
said technology.  This analysis is characterized by uncertainty (risk) and/or limited by 
information.  Many economic studies encompass the determinants of diffusion from 
the sociologists’ point of view, though economists tend to place more emphasis on 
economic factors such as profit and risk.  Economic theories on diffusion also look at 
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diffusion from the point of view of the adaptor of the technology, as well as how 
diffusion may also be influenced by the suppliers of the technology in terms of 
reduced costs over time.   A major subset of the diffusion literature concerns the 
effect of energy prices and environmental policies on the process of diffusion within 
several of the economic structures. 
In the 1960s and 1970s attention focused on technical change in terms of changes in 
demand and in relative factor prices.37  Zvi Griliches, an economist from Harvard 
University, is credited with being the first to look at the issue of adoption from an 
economist’s, not a sociologist’s, point of view.38   Griliches began the trend with his 
study on the diffusion hybrid maize in which he showed the role of demand for maize 
in determining the timing and location of the innovation. 39  Mansfield built on 
Griliches’ work and hypothesized that imperfect information constrained adoption; 
but he added that as knowledge was disseminated, the innovation itself was more 
widely disseminated.  These conclusions received more support from empirical 
studies.40 41   Later studies showed that both demand and supply factors were 
important. 42  At the same time, others put forward the idea that relative prices 
explained innovation since firms were focused on reducing costs. 43   
In the 1980s, the focus shifted to the idea of endogenous technical change and path-
dependency.  Two types of models were developed: one a growth theoretic model44  
and the other a microeconomic model.45  In the growth model, analysis is done in 
terms of the effect of changes in relative factor shares, between capital and labor, and 
not in terms of relative factor prices.  However, this model is severely criticized by 
William Nordhaus, an economist from Yale University.46  Nordhaus felt that in the 
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reallocation of factor shares there is no reallocation towards innovation, the net effect 
being growth theory with exogenous technological change instead of endogenous 
technical change.  The microeconomic model is based on the concept of an 
innovation-possibility curve where, given the right amount of R&D expenditure, a 
firm could maximize output based on labor and capital.  Both models are confined to 
the standard two-factor neoclassical model.  While this has limitations in the terms of 
understanding natural resources, the theories fit well into the framework of larger 
climate economic models used to analyze climate policy today.  The issue with this 
approach is that it ignores social feedback effects or externalities that could encourage 
one firm to adopt or discourage another firm from adopting the same technology.   
To those modeling climate/economic interactions, neoclassical analysis of the issue is 
most prominent in the sense of being the “mainstream” economic thought.  Induced 
technical change in neo-classical economic modeling is manifested in production 
functions.47  To date, policy considerations have not been introduced into the induced 
technical change functions of the models.  Instead, all policy representation has been 
exogenously applied to the model as a whole (i.e., air pollution regulation and carbon 
taxes constrain the model instead of being endogenously represented in the model). 
In line with neo-classical thought, empirical and theoretical studies that have focused 
on the production function assume induced technical change is a function of energy 
prices and cumulative production.48  This has advantages and disadvantages.  The 
production function is based on prices, so including non-price variables in the 
production function is not straightforward.  A recent dissertation work on the 
influence of regulations and economic incentives on technology change, in particular 
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the increase in energy efficiency of appliances and other technology characteristics, 
and the decrease in prices of these appliances over time, is one example of a study 
which tries to incorporate policies endogenously into the production function 
structure as well as including technical characteristics.49 However, non-market based 
approaches, such as information policies, are difficult to incorporate into the 
framework. 
Instead of relying on the neoclassical profit maximizing behavior model, two Yale 
economists, Richard Nelson and Sidney Wilson, defined evolutionary theory.50 Their 
theory is based on the idea of decision rules which are applied over an extended 
period of time.  The idea is that the production function is replaced by the concept of 
“routine,” defined as specified technical routines of the firm, procedures for hiring 
and firing, ordering inventory, research and development, advertising, or business 
strategies, etc.  The activities leading to technical changes are: local search for 
technical innovations, imitation of other firms, and satisfying economic behavior.  
However, little has been done to validate this framework.51   
Another argument that has been put forward is that technology change is “path 
dependent.”   In other words, technology choice is locked-in, based on historical 
choices.  The classic example of this idea is the typewriter keyboard, studied by 
Stanford University Economist Paul David.52  David explored the historical reasons 
why a typewriter with a QWERTY layout became the standard despite the fact that 
the layout is considered inefficient today.  The reasons for the lock-in were the 
linkage between the design of the keyboard and the typists skill at using it, the decline 
in costs of the QWERTY system relative to other systems, and the quasi-
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irreversibility of investment in both learning the skill.  These network externalities 
occur when a technology is more useful to the adopter if others are using the same 
technology (e.g., fax machines).  Path dependency or lock-in occurs when the 
standard has been chosen (e.g., Microsoft) and when the barriers to switching to 
another technology are high.   
 Energy Prices  
The economic literature on diffusion of technologies has focused heavily on the effect 
of energy prices on adoption and innovation.  Increasing energy prices will decrease 
the overall cost of the project because of cost offsets from revenue generation.  
However, sharply increasing energy costs may raise the cost of production of the 
technology and actually raise the cost of the technology during the time period.  
There may also be an effect on adoption and predicted or expected costs and benefits 
if energy prices are volatile, as can be the case with natural gas prices.  This could 
make a firm more cautious about implementing a project.   
Several empirical studies show a strong relationship between energy prices and 
patenting activity for energy technologies between 1970 and 1993. 53 54   Using 
patents as a proxy for solar powered technologies, these studies show that innovation 
of technologies such as solar power responded quickly and strongly to the particularly 
high energy prices during the 1970s energy crisis. Alternately, a similar empirical 
study which also uses patent data to estimate the effect of energy prices on energy-
efficiency innovations does not find a significant positive impact on innovation 
activity.    The study instead found a correlation between energy taxes (as a 
percentage of energy prices) and patent activity. 55  The two results may not be 
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inconsistent.  Long-term expected high energy prices may in fact be related to 
increases in patent activity. 56 
The diffusion of landfill gas projects is likely to be influenced by volatile or long-
term electricity and gas prices as well as oil prices.  Diffusion would also be affected 
by the ability of a landfill to sell the electricity at a close to market rate or sell the gas 
at a rate pegged to the oil price.  The premise behind State regulations such as net 
metering and renewable portfolio standards is that renewable resources such as 
landfill gas would not be a reliable source of electricity for a wholesale rate.  The 
regulations were enacted in order to encourage this behavior.  On the natural gas side, 
low natural gas prices in the 1980s were assumed to hinder direct use projects at 
landfills.  With increasing and volatile prices, industry found long-term contracts for 
landfill gas pegged on the price of oil more and more appealing.57  However, this 
effect has not been studied. 
 Environmental Policy  
There are a variety of policy instruments that can affect adoptions – providing 
information, command-and-control regulations, subsidizing adoption of key 
technologies or government purchase of the technology.  Several theoretical studies 
support the premise that environmental policy provides an efficient incentive for 
innovation and diffusion.58 59 60 The studies have looked at market-based approaches 
such as taxes/subsidies or cap-and-trade programs, information dissemination, and 
regulation.  The general conclusion of these studies has been that market-based 
environmental policies provide incentives for innovation and diffusion because they 
provide revenues or reduce costs.  This is believed to be the case for information 
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dissemination as well.61  Direct regulation, however, is believed to inhibit innovation 
and only force diffusion to those directly regulated and not the wider economy.  Once 
the standard has been reached, the industry will not bother to continue improvements.   
What is not well understood is how a sector will respond to a combination of 
environmental regulations.  The landfill sector is faced with a variety of overlapping 
policies at both the State and Federal level.  A landfill wanting to install an engine to 
combust landfill gas to produce electricity faces regulations related to the State 
Implementation Plan (SIP) to reduce air pollution emissions from fuel combustion, a 
Federal NSPS permitting process, and potentially net metering regulations, 
interconnection standards and an RPS.  Applying a climate policy on top of these 
policies and regulations may distort the effectiveness of one or more of the policies. 
 Learning-by-Doing and Learning-by-Using 
Learning-by-doing and learning-by-using are critical components of the diffusion 
process.   Learning-by-doing and learning-by-using are the representation of the 
learning and experience gained by producing and installing a technology that feeds 
back into the innovation process, allowing for revisions of the technology and 
increased diffusion.  Kenneth Arrow, a Nobel Prize winning economist, introduced 
the concept of technological learning-by-doing into the literature in 1962. 62   
Learning-by-doing represents the reduction in costs and improvement in technical 
efficiency associated with production of a technology (i.e., the more the firm 
produces, the better the firm is at producing the technology).  Learning-by-using is 
focused on the adopter where the adopter’s experience in using the technology over 
time allows the adopter to reap addition gains.   Empirical studies have supported 
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these theories.  While the impact of learning on costs is not disputed, the size of the 
effect is still in question.  
Learning-by-doing curves are typically estimated based on previous production (i.e., 
the more production in the previous period, the higher on the learning curve the firm 
finds itself).    Learning curve effects are defined as the reduction in costs associated 
with cumulative production.  As manufacturers repeatedly perform specific tasks, 
workers learn from the cumulative experience and can perform the tasks more 
efficiently.  This means the suppliers of the technology reduce their costs of 
production over time though learning-by-doing.  The landfill gas sector, as a small 
buyer of natural gas fueled technologies, takes improvements in the cost and 
efficiency of technologies as given from the primary sector.    
On the technology-user side, learning-by-using curve effect is the decrease in costs 
(particularly labor costs) associated with continued use and maintenance of a 
technology.  These curves incorporate the effects of training, technical improvements, 
and better management.  The curves may also include reductions in costs or 
efficiency gains associated with adapting a particular technology to a firm or sector 
specific use.  Learning-by-using in the landfill gas sector is assumed to be the primary 
innovation within this sector. 
Empirical Studies 
Reviewing the empirical literature confirms many of the conclusions in the theoretical 
pieces.  Empirical studies show ambiguous results when analyzing whether 
environmental standards may inhibit or encourage innovation.    “End-of-pipe” type 
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command and control regulations seem to stymie innovation by requiring a firm to 
choose a mandated technology and not innovate, while energy efficiency standards 
seemed to have stimulated technology innovation. 63   Regulated auto fuel efficiency 
standards in the US are effective, but other studies have shown that other regulations 
have either no discernable effect, such as the case of building standards; or have a 
negative impact where the regulation has postponed the retirement of older, less 
efficient installations.64  
Another example of the effect of environmental regulations on industry is an 
empirical study of whether or not environmental regulations had an impact on two 
aspects of investment decisions at paper mills. 65  The study found that State 
regulations have a weak impact on technology investment and choice and questioned, 
but did not answer, whether or not this was due to the fact that older plants, ones that 
would require a large investment to meet environmental regulations, were exempt 
from the regulations or grandfathered under the rule.  The study implied, but did not 
confirm, that minimum standards and direct regulation are not the only considerations 
in technology investment. 
Other studies focus on empirically estimating induced innovation in energy-saving 
technologies from the producer’s point of view.  One study analyzed the impact of 
energy prices and energy saving regulations on technological innovations in energy 
efficient appliances like gas water heaters. 66  The analysis found that approximately 
62 percent of the overall change in energy efficiency of these appliances was due to 
autonomous factors and not induced factors (such as energy prices and energy 
efficiency standards). Of the 38 percent effect of endogenous change, energy prices 
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had the largest effect due to increased commercialization or supply of new models 
and retirement of old models.  The study is based on the premise that if the price of 
energy is relative to other goods, demand will shift to energy-saving appliances and 
producers will introduce into the market innovative goods.  Within this framework, 
energy efficiency standards are introduced.  The study showed that both high energy 
prices in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as well as the energy efficiency standards set 
by the government, have a significant impact on the product menu.   
Studies exploring the effect of market-base mechanisms strongly support the theory 
that these mechanisms promote innovation and diffusion.67  One example of this is a 
paper on innovation in pollution control under the Clean Air Act of 1990. 68  The 
analysis shows that requiring or regulating plants constructed before 1990 to install 
scrubbers would lead to innovation that would lower the cost of compliance.  
However, the SO2 cap-and-trade program provided incentives to install scrubbers 
with higher removal efficiencies as well as lower costs.  The analysis concluded by 
asking whether or not command-and-control regulation actually leads to innovations 
aimed at avoiding the costs of compliance as opposed to increasing the efficiency or 
the benefits of the technology to society.         
Other empirical analyses have assumed green policies induce change and have 
actually used a measure of this change as a proxy measurement for the stringency of a 
policy.  For example, one study uses the rate of patenting in related technology fields, 
itself a proxy for induced innovation, as a proxy for the stringency of environmental 
regulation in that field. 69  Another study finds a significant correlation between 
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expenditures of R&D and pollution abatement expenditures. 70  However, they do not 
find a significant correlation between pollution control expenditures and patents.71 
While the conclusion that a stringent climate change policy will induce technical 
change in the affected sectors is hard to prove in absence of a climate change policy 
to study, there is some evidence that a climate change policy will encourage 
diffusion.  A technical review of climate policy models and the representation of 
environmental policy in economic models states that “available evidence on induced 
technological change by environmental polices and/or higher energy prices seems to 
support the hypothesis that (future, stringent) climate policies will encourage the 
innovation and diffusion of new technologies that will address the issue of controlling 
global warming in a more cost-effective way.” 72  The statement is qualified by 
saying: a) in the short-term, the diffusion will be of off-the-shelf products as R&D 
will be slower to respond to the signal; b) induced change may or may not reduce the 
overall cost of the policy; and c) the theory does not say anything about what mix of 
policy instruments would be the most effective in meeting a target.  The report also 
goes on to say that it is not enough to rely on a policy to induce technical change; 
there should be a specific technology policy to promote innovation and diffusion as 
well.   
Landfill gas technologies have been in place since 1975 and have been diffusing 
through the industry.  The diffusion of these methane capture-and-use technologies 
have followed a typical S-shaped curves as described by Mansfield.  In the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, the diffusion process was slow.  Since the early to mid-1990s, the 
diffusion process has increased.  It is not well understood how sociological and 
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economic factors are influencing diffusion and the choice of technologies, nor have 
these factors been analyzed for their potential influence on future policies.  Despite 
the introduction of new technologies such as microturbines and fuel cells, the 
majority of projects continue to adopt mature technologies such as reciprocating 
engines.  Better understanding of what is driving diffusion and technology choice will 
help design a more effective “offsets” policy. 
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Chapter 3: Duration Modeling 
One of the most important insights from the wide variety of historical empirical 
studies done on diffusion of individual technologies is the extent to which diffusion 
enhances innovation through the feedback of information about the utility and the 
operation of the technology, also called learning-by-using and learning-by-doing. 73  
In order to capture this effect, the literature has been moving away from bivariate 
analysis at the firm level, where adoption is measured at a point in time, in order to 
understand the causes of diffusion.  The dichotomy between diffusion as a process 
and adoption due to firm heterogeneity is artificial. 74  Diffusion is the aggregate of 
the firm’s adoption decisions.  Time may change the factors that affect a firm’s 
decision as well as the firm’s characteristics.  Because of this dynamic aspect of 
diffusion, more analysts are focusing on modeling the cumulative affects of adoption 
over time through techniques such as duration analysis and epidemic learning.   
A literature review of empirical studies on induced innovation in agriculture and 
industry find few studies that try to directly measure induced innovation. 75  The 
majority of empirical studies using neoclassical techniques focus instead on 
supporting the idea of induced technical change, but has not in fact separated the 
effects of technical change from factor substitution in the production functions used.  
Later studies separate out these effects.  Of the eight studies that attempt to test for 
induced technical change specifically, findings from only half of the studies are 
consistent with the theory of induced innovation.  In the other half, the findings are 
ambiguous, or the signs of the parameters are clearly the opposite of what the theory 
predicts.   
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The less-than-convincing results of the neoclassical studies and the limitations of 
studying the dynamics of change within the neoclassical structure has led researchers 
to move towards other models of induced technical change.  One alternative 
mathematic model is the epidemic model.  The epidemic model is used more by the 
sociological and marketing fields, but it is also used in some economic studies of 
technology diffusion.  The model assumes that all adopters have the same preference 
for the technology and that the cost of the technology is constant over time.  The 
difference is that not all adopters have the same information about the technology.  
As the technology is adopted, the information about the technology (learning-by-
using) is spread and increases the rate of adoption until the market is saturated.    This 
model also generates an S-shaped curve as predicted in diffusion theory.  Mansfield 
pioneered the use of the epidemic model based on profit and proportion of non-users.  
The model has been used empirically to study overall rate of diffusion, inter-firm 
diffusion, intra-firm diffusion, and international diffusion of a technology.76 
Duration analysis is a statistical means of identifying factors that have an effect on the 
length of time between two points.  When analyzing diffusion, the starting point can 
be the patent date, the date of the first use in the natural gas industry, or the date of 
the first use in the landfill gas industry.  The end date can be the date of the first use 
in the landfill gas industry or the date adopted by the specific firm.   
Duration analysis has become popular with researchers in diffusion studies after 
economists derived a theoretical approach to diffusion of technologies using duration 
analysis. 77 78  Adoption is based on the current price of the technology, movements in 
the prices expected to occur in the future for the technology, and expectations of 
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obsolescence. This theoretical exercise shows that if the industry supplying the 
technology is competitive with a large number of firms, there will be slower 
diffusion, because of expectations that prices will fall over time.   Another study 
using duration analysis finds that the main factors affecting the diffusion of 
technology in a UK engineering study are endogenous learning, firm size, industry 
growth rates, cost of the technology, and expected changes in the cost of 
technology.79 
Another trend in the literature is analyzing the simultaneous diffusion of two or more 
technologies throughout a sector.  Using duration analysis, one study looks at the 
complementary role between various technologies and learning at Italian 
metalworking firms.  It finds that learning due to the adoption of one technology has 
an impact on the adoption of the next technology. 80  A similar study analyzes the 
diffusion of two new technologies, specifically numerically controlled machine tools 
and coated carbide tools in the UK engineering and metal working industries, using a 
probit model. 81  The study concludes through both a theoretical and empirical 
approach that the adoption of one technology is affected by the explanatory variables 
related to the technology as well as the variables related to the technology the firm 
did not adopt. 
Duration Analysis is a relatively new technique in the economic field.82 83  It is based 
on a technique used by epidemiologists to model the survivorship of patients exposed 
to a certain disease.  In the case of technology adoption, survivorship means that the 
firm or entity has not adopted the technology; death of the patient is equivalent to 
adoption of the technology.  The technique has been used on a wide range of issues.  
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In the early 1970s, economists began using the technique to analyze issues such as the 
duration of unemployment.  Later, policy scientists began using the technique in the 
study of issues such as periods of war or peace in various regions.84 
Duration Analysis 
Duration analysis, or epidemic modeling techniques, is well documented. 85 86 87 88 
There are two basic types of duration analysis: proportional analysis and accelerated 
failure time analysis.  Proportional models compare the survival of different groups.  
Log linear survival time models are accelerated failure time models where the effect 
of the covariate is multiplicative over time.89 
Duration analysis, or survival analysis, is the modeling of time to event data. The 
technique identifies factors that have a statistically significant effect on the length of 
time between an entity’s entry into a specific state and the exit or entry into a new 
state.  In epidemiology, survival analysis focuses on the survival of people who 
contract a disease or are exposed to a disease and the length of time before the person 
becomes sick or dies from the disease.  In the context of this study, the spell is the 
difference between the first demonstration of a landfill gas project or opening of the 
landfill (whichever comes later) and the adoption of a landfill gas technology.  
The basic survival function is denoted S, which is defined as:   
S(t) = Pr(T<t) 
where t is some time, T is the time of death (in this case, the time of adoption of a 
landfill gas project), and "Pr" stands for probability.   The survival function is the 
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probability that the time of death (adoption) T is later than time t, or in the case of this 
study, the probability that a landfill will not adopt a landfill gas project at time t.  The 
survival function is non-increasing over time, since the probability of death, (or in the 
case of landfills – non-adoption), increases over time.   
Given that S(t) decreases over time, the lifetime distribution function, usually denoted 
F is defined as follows: 
F(t) = Pr (T ≤ t) = 1- S(t) 
In this study, F(t) is defined as the probability that a landfill will adopt a landfill gas 
technology.  The density function of the lifetime distribution can be estimated by 
taking the derivative of F (denoted as f),  
f(t) = d/dt F(t) 
where f is called “the event density,” which is the rate of death or failure events per 
unit of time.  The function f(t) is assumed to be a continuous probability density of 
the random variable T, where t is the realization of T and is the length of the spell. 
The event rate at time t conditional on survival up to time t is the hazard function.   
h (t) = lim      Pr(t ≤ T ≤ t + ∆ | T ≥ t) 
         ∆→0              ∆ 
 
h (t) = lim      F( t + ∆) – F( t) 
         ∆→0           ∆S(t) 
h (t)dt = f(t)/S(t)  
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The hazard function is nonnegative, λ (t) ≥ 0, but may be increasing or decreasing, 
nonmonotonic, or discontinuous.   It represents a continuous time equation of a 
sequence of conditional probabilities of adoption.    
The cumulative hazard function can be defined as: 
H(t) = ∫0
t h(u)du = ∫0
t [f(u)/S(u)]du  = ∫0
t [1/S(u)]{d/du S(u)} du  = -ln{S(t)} 
Therefore: 
S(t) = exp{-H(t)} 
F(t) = 1-exp{-H(t)} 
f(t) = h(t)exp{-H(t)} 
When a specific hazard function is specified, the equations can be further defined.  
An example is the Weibull model which will be used in this analysis.  The Weibull 
hazard function is defined as: 
h(t) = ptp-1 
where p is a shape parameter that is estimated using the dataset given in the analysis.  
Given the Weibull hazard form, the survivor, cumulative distribution, and probability 
density functions become: 
F(t) = 1- exp(-γtp ) 
S(t) = exp(-γtp) 
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f(t) = γpt(p-1)exp(-γtp) 
h(t) = γtp 
Once the hazard function is defined, the covariates can be analyzed using the 
maximum likelihood technique.   The likelihood function is the joint probability 
distribution of a sample with a vector of parameters θ. The likelihood function can be 
written as:  
L(θ) = ∑ln f(ti,θ)  
 i=1 to n 
Since the duration of the observations is at least zi where zi is the time censored for i, 
the likelihood function is: 
L(θ) = ∑di lnf(ti*,θ) + ∑(1-di)lnS(zi,θ) 
 = ∑di ln λ(ti,θ) + ∑lnS(ti,θ) 
Where ti = min (ti*, zi).  After this, explanatory variables, or covariates can be 
introduced into the survivor and hazard functions above; and the maximum likelihood 
procedure can be used to estimate the vector of parameters. 
Hazard Specification 
The hazard specification represents the underlying increase in diffusion due to an 
“epidemic learning.” Under adoption theory, this "epidemic learning" can be defined 
as learning-by-using, learning-by-doing, and/or information dissemination. 
 
 37 
 Cox proportional hazard model 
To avoid a parametric assumption concerning a baseline hazard rate, a Cox model can 
be used.  The Cox proportional regression estimates are the probability of failure at 
time t without reporting a baseline hazard rate.  Cox proportional models assume that 
the hazard does not depend on time and, therefore, that the proportional hazard is 
constant over time.  The Cox model is probably the most basic proportional hazard 
model because a parametric baseline does not have to be assumed by the modeler.   
 Exponential 
If failures occur randomly and the firms or individuals studied do not change or “age” 
over time, then it is appropriate to use the exponential distribution.90   In the case of 
landfills, this does not necessarily seem to be the best fit.  Landfills do “age” over 
time, decreasing their landfill gas output and making a landfill gas project less 
profitable and, therefore, less likely over time.   
The exponential distribution for a parameter γ>0 yields the following survivor and 
hazard functions: 
F(t) = 1- exp(-γt) 
S(t) = exp(-γt) 
f(t) = γexp(-γt) 





The Weibull distribution is a more general form of the exponential distribution and 
seems the most likely candidate for the underlying parametric distribution.    The 
Weibull distribution has two parameters. If the distribution shape parameter (p) in the 
Weibull distribution all equal 1 then the Weibull becomes an exponential distribution.  
If the shape parameter is greater than 1, then the hazard is increasing over time.  
Likewise, if p is less than one, the hazard is decreasing over time.91  If the Weibull 
distribution is the best fit for adoption in this sector, it is likely that that the shape 
parameter would be increasing over time. 
Given these two parameters, the survival and hazard functions for the Weibull 
distribution are as follows: 
F(t) = 1- exp(-γtp ) 
S(t) = exp(-γtp) 
f(t) = γpt(p-1)exp(-γtp) 
h(t) = γtp 
 Log-Logistic 
The log-logistic parametric shape increases and then decreases over time. This shape 
does not fit with the theoretical idea of technology adoption where adoption increases 
over time and then flattens out at some optimal point.  However, the shape of this 
distribution may have more significance when considering specific technologies 
 
 39 
where one technology may dominate then wane as another new technology 
dominates. 
The log-logistic distribution is also a two parameter distribution.  When p>1 the 
hazard first increases with time, then decreases.  If 0<p≤1 the hazard function 
decreases with duration. 
F(t) = 1 – [1/(1 + γtp)] 
S(t) = 1/(1 + γtp) 
f(t) = γpt(p-1)/(1 + γtp)2 
 Others 
There are several other parametric distributions, which for theoretical reasons were 
rejected.  These include the Poisson, Gamma, and Gompertz.  The shapes of these 
distributions do not follow the theory of technology adoption.  For example, with the 
Poisson distribution, the assumption is that each event (adoption) would occur 
independently of each other with a constant probability.  The assumption that each 
adoption is independent of each other does not fit with the information gathered from 
interviews and the literature on information dissemination, project demonstrations, 
etc., leading to development of new projects. 
Alternatives to Duration Analysis 
Several alternatives to the epidemic model exist: the generalized static model, 
dynamic modeling, vintage and stock adjustment models, threshold of probit models, 
learning models such as the Baysian learning approach, the game theoretic approach, 
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and duration analysis.  A generalized static model builds on the epidemic/logistic 
model in the sense that it incorporates information from one constant source as well 
as information from word-of-mouth and other economic variables such as product 
prices.  It divides the population into more than two groups, allowing for the rejection 
of the innovation altogether by a specific group.  While this model provides a flexible 
mathematical way of studying diffusion, it does not allow for any change in the 
population of adopters or for post-innovation improvements in the technology or 
application of the technology.   
A dynamic model allows for the declining real costs of technology due to cumulative 
improvements, learning by doing/using, and vintaging of capital over time, and for 
the reduction of risk due to the spread of information about the technology. 92  An 
example of this is a study using a system of two equations to evaluate the relationship 
between innovation output and market structure in an industry. 93  It supports the 
theory that both innovation activity and market structure are endogenous variables as 
well as variables of firm size and labor characteristics. 
Vintaging models are designed to allow capital stock turn-over to drive the adoption 
of new technology.  The premise is that firms will delay adoption until the old capital 
equipment needs to be replaced, at which time, the firm will buy the newer 
technology to replace the old.  Generally these studies are based on an epidemic or 




Threshold of probit models are static probit (or logit) models where the explanatory 
variables change over time.  These exogenous variables explain adoption; and as they 
change with time, the proportion of the population that decides to adopt increases.  
These models are based on actual explanatory variables instead of some proxy 
(usually time). 
Learning models have been developed in an attempt to explicitly model the effect of 
learning on the diffusion process.  The models, mostly tested in the area of 
agricultural innovation, have produced what can be described as “sensible results;” 
but the models have been criticized for using various learning mechanisms without 
explicitly justifying why the mechanism was used. 95   Bayesian learning seems to be 
the leading mechanism used, and it has been applied to both agricultural diffusion and 
industrial diffusion among firms and across sectors.  The models focus on learning, 
profitability and cost, attitudes towards risk, and initial uncertainty. 
The game theoretic approach assumes that even if all firms have exactly the same 
information about a technology, the behavior of each firm could lead to different 





Chapter 4: Analysis of Diffusion 
Landfill gas capture-and-use projects are considered by some to be a critical means of 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions, reducing ground-level ozone, increasing profits 
at landfill sites, and increasing the local energy supply.  A number of Federal and 
State policies encourage the capture-and-use of landfill gas.  However, there is a 
debate as to whether or not these policies are necessary to increase the adoption of 
landfill gas capture-and-use technologies.  Many argue that the price of electricity or 
natural gas is sufficient to encourage adoption.  Others argue that the majority of 
landfill gas capture-and-use projects are only marginally profitable and, without 
Federal and State incentives, would not be worth pursuing.96 
This chapter studies the effects of both policies and prices on the adoption of landfill 
capture-and-use projects.  The models reflect issues or variables raised in the 
interviews with developers, companies, associations, and consultants, as well as 
issues raised in the literature on landfill gas projects (see appendix A for interview 
coverage).  Variables identified by the research on the landfill gas sector fall within 
the sociological and economic categories identified in the theoretical literature 
review.  Using the variables identified from these experts, several forms of epidemic 
models are applied to the data.  First, the analysis looks at whether or not the example 
of landfill gas projects fits the epidemic model of adoption, or, more specifically, 
which baseline hazard function is appropriate.  Second, the analysis then looks at the 
correlation between the variables identified by experts and the literature on landfill 




An essential conclusion of current diffusion theory is that potential adopters have 
different or preferred adoption dates.97 In the literature, the reasons for the difference 
in preferred adoption dates are due not only to the spread of information (epidemic 
effects), but also to firm characteristics, policy structure, and prices faced by the firm. 
In the case of landfill gas capture-and-use projects, several studies have been funded 
by the USEPA to identify general barriers to adoption.98  The models in this study 
rely on responses from intensive interviews with landfill gas project developers and 
landfill owners to identify the following factors in deciding whether or not to pursue a 
landfill gas project.  Experts identified what they felt were the most critical issues, 
and their responses fell within the literature. Relying on information from these 
experts, I identified sixteen variables as key to whether or not to adopt a project.  Ten 
of the variables identified were related to environmental policies at the Federal and 
State levels, two variables were price related, one variable was technology specific, 
and three variables were related to the characteristics of the landfill.   In order to 
isolate the effects of the renewable energy policy and the price effects in the model, 
the remaining fourteen variables were used as control variables. 
Policies Related to Landfill Gas Collection and Emissions 
The first landfill gas capture-and-use project was installed in 1975, prompted by the 
energy crisis.  Interest seemed to wane once energy prices decreased. More recently, 
however, interest has increased due to Federal regulation of emissions from landfills.  
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The focus of regulation has primarily been on reducing air pollution, mainly 
NMVOCs, and other safety concerns. 99   
Landfills have used landfill gas projects as a way to recover costs while meeting 
Federal regulations.  Cost recovery and profit play a key role, but are not sufficient to 
explain the patterns of implementation.  Many regulated landfills, specifically those 
that must combust the gas, could do so economically by selling the energy produced, 
yet they opt to flare rather than capture the gas and sell the gas as energy.  LMOP 
staff has identified hundreds of landfills that could make money from capture-and-use 
technologies, but have not installed the technologies.  In addition, not all landfill with 
landfill gas projects fall under the Federal regulations.   
The final decision to install a capture-and-use project is influenced by a multitude of 
factors, including State renewable energy policies, Federal renewable energy and air 
pollution policies, energy prices, economics, and public opinion.100  Some mitigation 
options are profitable or attractive even without an environmental policy impetus; but 
other policy issues (at both the Federal and State levels), the availability of an end 
user, and lack of technical knowledge may hinder a firm’s ability to implement even 
profitable options. 
Many states have enacted RPS rules.  Most states consider landfill gas, if not a clean 
source of energy, at least a renewable source.  Renewable energy developers have 
also found that landfill gas is cheaper and easier to install than wind farms or solar 
farms.  Some states, in order to encourage more renewable energy projects, have also 
enacted rules and regulations that make it easier for operators generating electricity to 
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sell the electricity back to the grid at a reasonable price.   States have enacted other 
policies that promote renewables, including net metering, green power provisions, 
disclosure rules about the mix of fuels being used for electricity in an area, and 
financing provisions.  Currently, 38 states have interconnection standards, 41 have net 
metering regulations, 24 have RPS standards, and 10 have green power purchasing 
programs.101 
Federal regulations on air quality at landfills encourage landfill gas projects, but State 
requirements to comply with NOx, O3, and carbon monoxide (CO) standards may 
actually create an administrative burden to the landfill.  Reducing landfill gas by 
venting or leaking to the atmosphere reduces ozone levels and odor problems.  
Collecting landfill gas to be used as energy or to feed a flare significantly reduces the 
amount of gas that could fuel a landfill fire.  However, power generating technologies 
also produce volatile organic compounds (VOCs) and NOx, the precursors to O3.  
Permitting power generation technology may be difficult for landfills, particularly in 
areas where the US government has classified the area as a “non-attainment” area.   
Other barriers may include lack of information or experience with landfill gas 
technologies or the inability to finance the project. 
 Federal Policies 
Section 29 and Section 45 under the IRS Code 
Several experts note that all landfill gas projects, including flaring, take advantage of 
tax credits, specifically those credits laid out in Section 29 and Section 45 of the IRS 
Tax Code.102  Experts feel that the tax credits are necessary to continue production of 
landfill gas as an energy source.  Higher energy prices help the economics of a 
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project, but when comparing landfill gas to coal, landfill gas is still considerably more 
expensive.   
Facilities that use biomass to convert to gas before use as a fuel qualify for a tax 
credit of 99.3 cents per million Btu or 1 cent per kilowatt hour under Section 29 of the 
Internal Revenue Code.  The credit is adjusted each year for inflation.  The Section 29 
tax credit started in 1979 and was extended to 1996 by the Energy Policy Act of 
1992.  The tax credit has been renewed twice since to cover the period between 1992 
and 1998 as well as extend beyond the 1998 time period.  The credit is divided 
between large and small landfills; larger landfills getting $2 per barrel oil equivalent 
for 4 years of 200,000 cubic feet per day production and small landfills getting $3 per 
barrel oil equivalent for 4 years of 200,000 cubic feet per day production (2002 
dollars).103   
However, a great deal of uncertainty is associated with the tax credits.  The tax credit 
was designed so that only the producer (Genco) could use the tax credit and the 
energy had to be sold to a third party.  In 1996, of the approximately 140 LFG 
capture-and-use projects running, approximately half of them used the tax credits.104  
After two years of annual extensions, Section 29 was instated to 2007.105  The limited 
coverage of the tax credits, four years of production, and only 200,000 cubic feet per 
day, coupled with the uncertainty of whether or not the tax credits would exist in the 
future, limited the tax credits' influence on a firms' decision making.  In addition to 
the uncertainty, the tax credits were designed not to help the landfill, but to help the 
Gasco (the company which owns the gas).  Section 29 tax credits were based on the 
sale of the LFG to the Genco.  The Gasco (not the owner or the Genco) filed for and 
 
 47 
received the tax credits.  Many private companies spun off Gascos from their 
companies in order to take advantage of the tax credits. 
These same landfills which are eligible for the Section 29 tax credit are also eligible 
for the new Section 45 tax credit.  Under Section 45, the tax credits for generating 
electricity go to the Genco.  The Section 45 tax credit is worth 1.2 cents per kilowatt 
hour for the first five years of electricity generation (which is roughly equivalent to 
$1.20 per million Btu).106  Section 45 is considered important to the development of 
current projects.  The waste management industry associations lobbied for the tax 
credit and lobbied to have it apply to the Genco. 
Section 29 is not represented in this analysis.  The use of a dichotomous policy 
variable for Section 29 would mean a value of one for all years of the analysis.  A 
numerical value for the policy does not capture the uncertainty surrounding the policy 
during the mid-1990s, the most critical time in the development of landfill gas 
projects.  Section 45 was not enacted in 2004 and is, therefore, beyond the scope of 
this analysis.   
Renewable Energy Production Incentive (REPI) 
The Renewable Energy Production Incentive (REPI), part of the Energy Policy Act of 
1992, was enacted to promote renewable fuel use to generate electricity through tax 
incentives to State and local facilities.  The policy began in 1993 and lasted until 
2003.  Qualifying facilities received the equivalent of 1.5 cents per kilowatt hour in 
1993.  While this represents a significant increase in potential revenue for projects, 
payments to qualifying landfills depended on sufficient appropriations by Congress.  
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In the first two years of the REPI program, there were sufficient appropriations to 
make full payments to owners of all qualifying landfills.  After that point, only partial 
payments or no payments could be made to landfills that qualified for the program.107   
New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) 
In addition to tax credits and energy policies, environmental regulations may also 
have a positive or negative impact on adoption of capture-and-use projects at 
landfills.    Under the Clean Air Act, the NSPS regulation or Landfill Rule requires 
that landfills over a 2.5 million Mg of MSW test their landfill gas emissions.  If gas 
emissions are above 50 mega grams per year of landfill gas (LFG), the landfill is 
required to put in a collection system for the gas.  While the original regulation which 
declared MSW emissions a pollutant was passed in 1991, the 1996 regulation 
finalized the actual emissions standards.  NSPS is focused on limiting NMVOCs in 
landfill gas emissions because they are precursors to ground level O3 as well as CO.   
Unfortunately, states are still at different levels of understanding about the standards 
and do not always coordinate their waste and air regulations.  This leads to the 
misunderstanding that a landfill gas capture-and-use project is an additional source of 
pollution, not a reduction technique.108 
The Landfill Rule requires large landfills to collect their landfill gas and flare or 
produce energy.  While flaring reduces local air pollution and addresses safety 
concerns caused by the flammable gas migrating through the landfill, it does not 
capitalize on the value of the landfill gas as an energy source.  Flaring also does not 
offset air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions caused by displacing coal or oil use.  
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LMOP literature also notes that collection systems with flares are not as closely 
maintained as those that produce landfill gas for sale, creating more emissions or 
leakage from the collection system.109  Flaring is not considered a landfill gas project 
in this analysis; only capture-and-use projects are considered.  When a large landfill is 
required to flare but instead opts for a capture-and-use project, this reduces the overall 
cost of the project since the gathering system is already in place. 
Under the LMOP program (below), USEPA promotes landfill capture-and-use 
projects as a way to recover costs of meeting the NSPS regulation.  Landfills over a 
certain size are required to install a gathering system for the gas and, at a minimum, 
flare the gas under the regulation.  Many companies see this as a sunk cost, making 
capture-and-use projects more attractive.     
Landfill Methane Outreach Program (LMOP) 
Studies on the effectiveness of information provision policies illustrate that these 
policies can increase use of a technology, particularly in the case of imperfect 
information networks.110 111 The Landfill Methane Outreach Program (LMOP) is a 
Federal program administered by the USEPA to disseminate information about 
landfill gas capture-and-use projects.  The program was created to address four 
critical areas: 
• lack of information and the perception that LFG projects are high risk by 
disseminating information on project opportunities and the environmental, 
energy and economic benefits of LFG projects; 
• Costly permitting and other regulatory hurdles by working with Federal and 
State regulators to increase their understanding of the issues; 
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• Poor rate of return on project investment by working with utilities and other 
energy purchasers to increase recognition of the benefits of LFG projects; and 
• Misperception that projects are not profitable through workshops, site visits 
and case studies of projects that are cost-effective. 
The program also enrolls partner organizations, such as State organizations, NGOs, 
developers, and vendors into the partnership to help facilitate information exchange.  
Experts also cite LMOP as being extremely useful in educating local and State 
officials on the benefits of projects, smoothing the permitting process.112 The 
literature on the effectiveness of success of voluntary policies is available, though no 
specific study focuses on the LMOP program. 113 114     
 State Policies 
State policies are geared towards encouraging renewable energy projects in general.  
Interviews with experts were split as to whether or not these policies encourage 
landfill gas capture-and-use projects.  A 1996 report by the Department of Energy's 
(DOE) Energy Information Agency (EIA) on Renewable Energy states that, “The 
reach of State and local environmental regulations is expanding at an increasing rate.  
According to industry sources, the costs for LFG [landfill gas] energy recovery 
projects of complying with all pertinent regulations are escalating faster than the 
inflation rate and the original financial assumptions.”115   In the same report, EIA 
states that, “State incentives in the form of favorable utility contracts for electricity 
projects have contributed to the development of LFG energy recovery projects more 
than any other government incentive program [no study cited].” However, this is a 
mixed blessing.  Landfill developers are faced with diverse rules across states, 
particularly pertaining to air quality permits, which sometimes add to the transaction 
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costs of the project.  These policies may actually make other renewable energy 
projects more attractive than landfill gas projects. 
Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) and Green Power 
Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS), which include landfill gas projects, have been 
adopted in over 20 states since the mid-1990s.  RPS is a market-oriented policy used 
to encourage renewable resources into the electric sector.  An RPS introduces a 
schedule for the minimum amount of renewable electricity (as a percent of total 
electricity production) for each electricity producer.  Each producer is forced to 
comply either by purchasing enough renewable energy to meet the percentage 
standard or by buying credits from producers that exceed their standard.  This trading 
system provides a least-cost approach to reaching the State-wide target.  The State 
monitors and verifies the crediting system.   
The issue with RPS is whether or not the State in question would have met the 
standard in the absence of the policy.  In other words, to what extent does the 
standard increase renewable energy in the State?  One case is Maine, where the RPS 
standard seems particularly high at 30 percent. 116  Considering that 45 percent of 
Maine’s electricity already comes from renewables, this is misleading.  In general, 
states choose a standard above their current rate and then tighten the standard over 
time.  Announcing the policy ahead of time and the gradual tightening of the standard 
allow the industry to respond to the standard without spikes in energy prices.   
Another issue with RPS is what is defined as a renewable energy source.  Many 
people would immediately think of “clean” energy sources such as wind or solar.  
 
 52 
Some states also include renewable sources that are not considered “clean,” such as 
waste incineration and landfill gas.  These sources of energy tend to be cheaper than 
traditional renewables and also have co-benefits if managed properly.   
States with RPS specify the percentage or amount of renewable energy generation 
they want operating by a specific date.  Many states have yearly targets over a ten to 
fifteen year period.  In addition to the RPS standard in percentage terms, some states 
are requiring specific megawatt standards for renewable energy.  Texas is requiring 
2000 MW of renewables by 2009.117  Each state has a specific mix of renewable fuels 
and technologies which they target.  Generally, a state creates a system where the 
generation of renewable energy earns credits that are certified by the state.  Energy 
providers or utilities purchase the credits from renewable generators.  At the end of 
each year, each energy provider is required to hold a certain number of credits.  
Some experts noted that State RPS programs helped push projects in the absence of 
the Federal Tax credits, though this view not shared by all.  Other experts also noted 
that RPS credits are not hard contracts, but a soft incentive, unlike the tax credits.  
Ownership of the generated credits is somewhat of an issue, because many landfills 
have three parties involved (the owner, Gasco and Genco).  In some states, it is not 
clear which party receives the benefit from the sale of the credits to the provider. 
Some programs (e.g., Massachusetts) have to be renewed on an annual basis, and this 
creates a paperwork burden on the Genco.  Despite the problems, many of the 
projects relied on RPS in absence of the tax credit.   LMOP representatives could not 
think of a project that was not done with RPS when Federal tax credits were 
suspended.118   
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Green power purchasing is also gaining acceptance in some states.  In some states 
customers are willing to pay a slightly higher price for electricity in order to increase 
the amount of electricity generated from renewables.  Eight states require that a 
specific percentage of electricity purchased for government buildings come from 
green power sources such as landfill gas, wind power, or solar power. Twenty cities 
have formed green power “buying blocks.” Green power can be bought via utility 
pricing programs, green power marketers, or green power contracts.  Four states 
require some utilities to offer customers the option of purchasing green power. 119 
These programs are still too new to analyze with the current data set. 
Net metering 
Net metering generally means that excess electricity produced by a consumer is given 
to the utility or is bought by the utility at a rate usually lower than the retail price of 
electricity in the area.  As of 2000, 18 states had net metering statutes that required 
utilities to buy electricity that the utility customer does not use.  As of June 2003, 33 
states had net metering (or net billing) regulations.  By 2005, 39 states or territories 
had net metering laws. 120 
The Federal Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) in 1978 provided the 
basic framework for State net metering laws.  Net metering laws allow customers to 
sell the power they generate themselves (using technologies such as photovoltaic 
panels) back to the utility at the utilities “avoided cost.”  The law greatly simplifies 
the purchase of renewable energy generated by customers.  For independent power 
 
 54 
producers such as a landfill gas project, the process is more complicated and requires 
that a utility sign a net purchase and sale agreement which must be negotiated.   
Interconnection standards 
State interconnection standards simplify the interconnection process through 
standardized forms and rules.  Each company applies for interconnection during the 
development phase of the project, and each state and/or utility has a different set of 
rules for interconnection.  Developers (Genco) may face a variety of standards when 
working across states.  Despite this, Gencos still must negotiate a contract with the 
utility.  In this analysis, the presence of a State interconnection standard is 
represented by a dichotomous variable indicated when the standard was implemented 
in a specific state. 
Financial Instruments 
All states currently have financial incentives to increase production of renewable 
energy.  These incentives include: 
• Corporate tax credits or deductions for installing or using renewable energy 
(16 states have state run programs); 
• Grant programs to encourage the development and use of renewable energy 
(24 states, 8 privately funded options in 5 states, 5 local governments); 
• Low or no-interest loans for residential, commercial, or industrial purchase of 
renewable energy technology (17 states, 10 utilities in 4 states, 8 local 
governments); 
• Production incentives or cash per unit of electricity produced (7 states, 11 
utilities in 10 states, 2 local programs in 1 state, 54 privately funded programs 
in 49 states); 
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• Exemptions, exclusions, or credits on property taxes for installing a renewable 
energy project (25 states); 
• Rebates for installing renewable energy technology (11 states, 41 utility run 
programs in 12 states, 3 local programs in 3 states, and 1 privately funded 
program); 
• Exemption on sales tax when purchasing renewable energy equipment (15 
states); and 
• Recruitment by states and local government of renewable energy providers (7 
states and 1 locality).121 
The above financing options will apply to landfill gas depending on the wording of 
the State or local policy.  Some policies may apply only to solar and/or wind power.   
Most states have financial incentives to promote renewable energy projects, including 
landfill gas projects.  Instruments include loans, tax credits, production incentives, 
grants, purchasing agreements, and rebate incentives.  The experts interviewed stated 
that few projects use the State grants and loan programs offered.122   
 Environmental Compliance 
Landfill gas project developers encounter difficulties in obtaining air permits, 
particularly in ozone NOx and CO non-attainment areas.  Non-attainment areas are 
those counties that fail to meet the National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
(NAAQS).  Permits can require lengthy negotiations with State representatives.  The 
more stringent the air requirement and whether or not the landfill is located in a non-
attainment area may influence whether or not a landfill decides to develop a landfill 
gas project. 
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) requires compliance with the 
Clean Air Act limiting NOx and CO in ozone non-attainment regions.  Many areas 
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are still considered in “non-attainment” areas by Federal air pollution laws, requiring 
State permits to install any type of power project.   
Until very recently, air permits have been a hurdle to landfill gas capture-and-use 
projects. Landfill gas projects were seen as a potential source of air pollution and 
developers had difficulty gaining permits, particularly in areas with low air quality 
thresholds, until a ruling by EPA declared landfill gas “recycled” which let it be 
treated differently under NSPS. 123   Despite this, problems obtaining air permits have 
not prevented projects, but instead have increased the time and cost of developing the 
project.  Delays and increased costs have turned a few landfill projects from capture-
and-use projects to flaring.   
Energy Prices 
The economics of a landfill gas project is largely influenced by the revenue stream 
produced by the project.  Landfill gas is purchased by an end user in a direct use 
project for a negotiated price over a long time period and pegged to the national 
average oil price. 124  This guarantees the industry buyer a long-term, local supply of 
fuel and protects them from the volatile price of natural gas.  Because untreated 
landfill gas has various other gases mixed into it, the buyer must compensate for the 
“dirty” mixture through higher maintenance costs.  The buyer then negotiates a less 
than market price to cover the higher maintenance costs.   
Landfills also enter into long-term electricity contracts with utilities for an electricity 
generation project.  In states where net metering laws exist, the electricity utility has 
access to electricity from small, individual producers at the "avoided cost" to the 
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utility.  To compete with this price, the landfill gas project may end up negotiating a 
lower price in order to get the long-term contract.  These contracts can make or break 
a landfill gas project. 
Revenue from projects can be low enough that even mature technologies may be too 
expensive to operate.  Local utilities consider only cost (not the reduction of 
environmental externalities) when negotiating contracts.  Low energy prices also limit 
the market for landfill gas generated energy.  Experts noted that there are other issues 
that must be dealt with during the process of developing a project.  However, if the 
economics are right (i.e. the revenue is high enough relative to the cost), other issues 
such as air permits, financing, etc. can be overcome. 
US Landfill Characteristics 
Landfills are engineered sites permitted to receive non-hazardous solid wastes, 
including household trash, construction debris, and sludge from sewage treatment.  
Each landfill is managed to prevent leachate (the liquid produced when water 
percolates through the waste) from entering ground water; to reduce smells, rodents, 
and other potential health hazards; and to prevent excessive air pollution.   
Modern landfills in the US are lined with plastic or bentonite clay to prevent toxic 
leachate from migrating into groundwater.  To reduce smells, health issues from 
rodents, and other health hazards, a layer of soil is spread over each layer of garbage, 
usually at the end of each operating day.  In addition, large landfills are regulated to 
safely collect landfill gas that is approximately 49% methane and highly flammable.    
Combustion, or flaring, destroys the methane along with other organic compounds 
 
 58 
that can be hazardous or cause odor.  The gas also carries toxics and other air 
pollutants that can be destroyed through flaring or through combustion as an energy 
source.125 
Municipal solid waste landfills produce methane when bacteria decompose the 
organic wastes such as paper products, food, and yard wastes under anaerobic 
conditions.  The amount of methane produced at a landfill depends on the quantity of 
the organic material, the nutrients available to the methane-producing bacteria, the 
moisture content of the landfill, the depth of the landfill (which regulates the 
temperature), and the pH of the landfill.  The process requires six months to two years 
to start producing methane and continues for approximately 30 years, depending on 
the amount of organic waste in the landfill and other conditions such as temperature 
and pH.  Methane is released into the atmosphere when the methane migrates through 
the soil of the landfill cover.126 
Between 1980 and 2003, the amount of waste disposed in landfills increased 50% to 
236 million tons of waste per year.  The per capita rate of 4.5 pounds per person per 
day has stayed relatively stable since the early 1990s.  The largest component of this 
waste is organic materials that break down to produce landfill gas:  paper products -  
35 percent of municipal solid waste; wood -  6 percent; yard trimmings - 12 percent; 
food scraps - 12 percent; glass, metals, and plastics - about 24 percent; and rubber, 
leather, textiles, and other goods - about 10 percent.  The amount of organic materials 
in the total waste sent to landfills continues to decrease due to recovery, recycling, 
and incineration.  Approximately 30 percent of total waste is recovered through 
recycling, composting, and other recovery programs.  The remaining two-thirds of 
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municipal solid waste produced is disposed in approximately 2,300 municipal solid 
waste landfills. 127   
Several non-policy and non-economic variables influence the diffusion of technology 
and must be controlled for in the model.  Methane generation potential of the landfill 
is a function of the landfill’s size, the climate, the composition of the solid waste, and 
the age of the landfill.  The amount of methane generated has a large impact on 
whether or not a project is feasible.  In addition, the ownership of a landfill may 
encourage landfill gas.  Private ownership is thought to be more innovative and, 
therefore, more likely to adopt a project.  Lastly, the model is also controlled for the 
variances in State cultures towards both environmental issues and landfill projects 
specifically. 
Landfill Ownership and the Structure of a Project 
Approximately 78 percent of all landfills are owned by State and local authorities, 
while 20 percent are owned by private companies.  Most of the privately owned 
landfills are owned by a few national waste management companies.  The rest are 
federally owned facilities. 128   
There are a limited number of national waste companies.  The largest is Waste 
Management with 235 landfills in 49 states, 72 of which have landfill gas projects in 
approximately 22 states.129  Waste Management became the largest waste service 
provider in 1998 when USA Waste Services, Inc., merged with Waste Management, 
Inc.  The company is traded on the New York Stock Exchange and operates in 13 
countries outside of North America.   
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The second largest company in the US, Allied Waste Services (formerly BFI) 
currently runs 177 landfills in 37 states, 167 of which are still active.  The third 
largest company, Republic Services, runs 52 landfills in 20 states.  The fourth largest 
company, Onyx, runs 26 landfills in 11 states.  IESI and Waste Connections run 6 and 
5 landfills in 4 and 3 states respectively.  Various departments within the US Federal 
government run 56 landfills in the US. 130   
Whether or not the firm is privately owned influences the flexibility of the gas project 
ownership structure.  A private firm is more able to restructure or spin off parts of the 
company in order to maximize tax credits and generation revenues; they can, 
therefore, receive more benefits from a landfill gas project. The structure of a landfill 
gas project is defined by the IRS tax credit system.  The landfill owner leases the 
landfill gas (LFG) development rights to the LFG developer.  In return, the owner 
receives lease payments and royalties.  The landfill owner is responsible for the 
maintenance of the landfill, including LFG migration control. 
Separate from the landfill owner, the Gasco is the developer who sets up the LFG 
collection system.  The Gasco pays the landfill owner production payments, royalties, 
etc., and is responsible for constructing operating and maintaining the LFG collection 
system.  The Gasco then sells the LFG to a separate legal entity, the Genco who 
generates electricity from the fuel.  The Genco is responsible for the construction and 
maintenance of the power generation facility. 
Under this ownership structure, different tax credits go to different entities.  A private 
company can spin off a development company and a generating company and 
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maximize on tax credits.  A public organization can not receive tax benefits.  This 
also creates a structure where the privately owned companies have their own 
development companies whose job it is to look for LFG project development 
opportunities across the company's portfolio of landfills.  This may drive diffusion of 
these projects through the private sector. 
Size, Age, Composition, and Precipitation 
The size of the landfill in terms of volume of waste, the age of the landfill, the 
composition of the waste put into the landfill, and the precipitation in the area where 
the landfill is sited determines the amount of landfill gas produced by the landfill.  
The gas output is a key factor in the economics of a landfill gas project.  Landfills 
with high potential volumes of methane generation are more attractive to end users of 
the fuel who prefer a guaranteed long-term price and supply of the fuel.  
CA Dummy Variable 
A recurring topic in the interviews and literature is the difference between California 
and the rest of the US.  Experts noted several issues, including the 34 air districts 
where each district has its own rules and procedures, high demand for renewables, 
popular attitudes which promoted environmental ideals, an innovative culture ready 
to take risks on new technologies, and the business attitude of an early adopter.131  
The complicated government structure and strict environmental guidelines can hinder 
certain projects, but attitudes towards alternative energy and environmentally sound 
technologies can encourage projects.  A dummy variable was introduced to the 
equation to capture these effects, because other states do not have air districts to 
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implement their air quality standards and because of the striking difference between 
California and other states on environmental issues including climate change and 
renewable energy. 
Variable Specification 
The data set used in this analysis is panel data based on the LMOP database, DSIRE 
State renewable database, EIA energy data, NASA weather data, and a variety of US 
and State government reports.  In addition to collecting data and the literature review, 
I conducted a series of interviews with developers, landfill owners/operators, experts 
and associations.  Developers and landfill owners/operators interviewed are 
associated with 25% of all landfill gas projects and have projects in 41 states (see 
appendix A for coverage information).   
Approximately 1145 landfills are considered in the analysis during the time period 
from 1978 to 2003.  All data described below is lagged two years before the start date 
of the project.  From interviews with experts and a review of the LMOP literature on 
decision making process of the landfill, I found that the decision to build a project, 
including policy and financial analyses, happens on average two years in advance of 
the project.  Because most project decisions are made two to three years in advance of 
the actual start date of the project, all variables are lagged. 
The data set is restricted to those landfills which are considered "candidate" landfills 
for a project.  This means a pre-feasibility economic analysis has been done to show 
that a landfill gas project could be done cost-effectively at the landfill.  Because of 
this, cost data for individual technologies are not included to avoid double counting. 
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Below is a description and discussion of the variables in the data set.  For data 
summary statistics, see appendix B. 
Table 3: Variable Specification and Data Sources 
Variable Description Source Validation 
(if necessary) 
Federal Policies    
Renewable Energy Production 
Incentive (REPI) 
Dichotomous variable where 
the value 1 indicates the 
program was implemented.   EIA reports 
Code of Federal 
Regulations 
(CFR) 
New Source Performance 
Standard (NSPS or "Landfill 
Rule") 
Variable equal to 0 before 
1996, variable equal to 1 after 
1996, variable equal to 2 for 
landfills required to flare after 
1996. CFR EPA summaries 
Landfill Methane Outreach 
Program (LMOP) 
Number of members in a state 
by year.  Members include 
landfill managers, state and 
local officials, vendors and 
NGOs.  A proxy for the spread 







State Policies    
Renewable Portfolio Standards 
(RPS) 
Variable equal to 1 if state has 
an RPS standard for that year 







Variable equal to 1 if state has 
a net metering rule for that 






Variable equal to 1 if state has 
an interconnection standard for 






Total number of financial 
instruments available in the 
state related to LFG 
technologies. 
DSIRE 
Database State websites 
Air Pollution standards by 
county for non-attainment 
areas 
Variable has value of 0 if 
landfill located in a county 
meeting the air pollution 
standard; 1 if county in non-
attainment with target level of 
100; 2 if in non-attainment 
with target level of 50; 3 if 







Energy Prices    
Electricity prices 
Cents per kilowatt hour (2005 
dollars) EIA  
Oil prices Dollar per barrel (2005 dollars) EIA  
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Control Variables    
Methane Potential  
size as measured by waste-in-
place variable x precipitation 
variable See below:  
Waste-in-Place 
The variable ranged from 1 to 
6 depending on the size 
category of the landfill.   LMOP Landfill reports 
Climate data 
(precipitation) 
The variable is equal to 1 if 
sufficient rainfall available in 
the state for methane 
generation; 0 otherwise. NASA  
Private ownership 
The variable is equal to 1 if the 








CA dummy variable 
The variable is equal to 1 if 





Characteristics    
NOx Emissions 







The REPI tax credit bill specified that the tax credit increase over time at the rate of 
inflation, so the real value of the credit was the same for all years.  Because of this, 
the presence of the REPI tax credit is denoted by a dichotomous variable which has 
the value of 1 after 1993 to represent the presence of the tax credit in those years. 
NSPS is represented by a variable that is equal to 0 before 1996, is equal to 1 after 
1996, and is equal to 2 if the landfill has tested emissions under NSPS and must 
capture and flare/use methane emissions.  The variable is divided into three parts, 
instead of using a dichotomous variable similar to the REPI variable; because the 
threat of legislation or future regulation seems change behavior even at landfills that 
have not reached the Landfill Rule cut-off point.  Many landfills below the 2.5 Mg 
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standard are designing and building their landfills with wells in order to meet a future 
regulation.132 
In order to capture the LMOP programs' information network and reach, the variable 
for LMOP represents the number of partners in a given state in a given year.  This 
measurement is the metric LMOP uses to measure success and best represents the 
spread of information through information networks in the sector. 
An analysis of the targets for RPS above and beyond what is already in place shows 
that many of the RPS targets are actually similar increases, with little deviation 
among them, though an exact comparison is difficult because of the different time 
frames and focus of the standards (see Appendix B for mean and standard deviation 
of the RPS annual increase in stringency variable) .  For the nine states with RPS in 
place during the analysis period, the RPS standards translated roughly into increases 
of 1 percent per annum, with two of the states having already exceeded their targets 
(Maine and Iowa).133  Most RPS standards start off with low targeted increases in the 
beginning.  Some RPS have annual increases held constant over several years or have 
a percentage goal for a given year where it is expected that the amount of renewable 
energy will slowly increase over time.  The ultimate targets in this case are generally 
stated in terms of a 2015 to the 2025 goal.  In the period covered by this analysis, that 
translates into only soft, modest targets.   
Because of the complexities in comparing the standards and the similarity among the 
standards in the early years of RPS, the variable used in the model does not reflect the 
strength of the RPS standard but instead reflects the presence of an RPS rule in the 
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state.  The presence of an RPS rule in a state after the year it was promulgated is 
denoted by a dichotomous variable.  RPS rules that did not include landfill gas as an 
option were not included in the variable.   
The variable for net metering laws and interconnection standards are dichotomous 
variables which equal one in the years the legislation applies to the state where the 
landfill is sited. 
State financial incentives, including loans, grants, and taxes, are mostly based on 
technology (i.e., grants for the use of fuel cells).  While these technologies can be 
used for landfill gas projects, the original intention of most of the financial incentives 
is to promote solar and wind projects.  In looking at these incentives, I ran the 
adoption model with these incentives broken out by type (taxes, grants, loans).  I 
found that loans were insignificant in the analysis; taxes were significant but had a 
negative affect on adoption; and grants had a significant positive affect.  However, 
the break out of this variable significantly increased the frailty of the model.  
Therefore, I used a variable which measure the number of instruments available to a 
developer in a given state.  The idea is that if a variety of instruments covering 
several different types of technologies exist, a developer is more likely to develop a 
project.  The financial instruments variable is the total number of State financial 
instruments available to a landfill.134 
The air permit and non-attainment variables in the equations are an interaction 
between whether or not the area was in non-attainment (by county) and the level of 
the State standard.  For example, if a landfill has the value 0 if located in a county in 
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attainment; I used the value 1 for areas in non-attainment with a standard of 100 
tons/year specified under the State Implementation Plan (SIP) as the standard for non-
attainment areas; the value 2 is used for areas in non-attainment with a standard of 50 
tons/year; a value of 3 is used for areas in non-attainment with a standard of 25 
tons/year; and a value of 4 is used for areas in non-attainment with a value of 10 
tons/year for the specific pollutant.135  Originally I considered using the actual target 
pollutant levels, but the variable values were orders of magnitude higher than other 
variables in the equation. 
I used two variables to represent revenue from the landfill gas project: electricity 
prices and natural gas prices over time.  Price data are EIA data in 2005 US dollars 
and are reported in cents/kWh and $/barrel for electricity and oil prices, respectively.   
The variable representing the potential methane production from the landfill is a 
function of the size, by category, and sufficient precipitation in the state the landfill is 
located, a dichotomous yes/no variable.  The amount of waste-in-place determines the 
size of the landfill.  Each landfill is then categorized by size according to the LMOP 
program standard size categories for LFG projects.  Sufficient levels of precipitation 
are determined by an average annual rainfall of greater than 40 inches per year.136   
Private ownership is a dichotomous variable that is equal to 1 for privately owned 
firms. 
I introduced the CA dummy variable to capture the effects of the complicated 
environmental governance structure of the State and the innovative and progressive 
attitudes of the mainstream in California.  I originally considered trying to using 
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polling data on environmental issues across all states over time to pull out the effect 
of attitudes by state.  However, this data are unavailable over the time period 
considered.  Instead, both of these effects are lumped into the geographical dummy 
variable, making it impossible to pull apart why a landfill in California is more likely 
to have a project even after controlling for policies, prices, and landfill characteristics. 
NOx emissions levels for each technology are from engineering studies of electricity 
generation technologies and boilers.  I converted the emission measurements into 
pounds per megawatt hour (lbs/MWh) equivalence using a Btu to megawatt hour 
ratio.  I only use this variable in the models presented in Chapter 5 because it is 
relevant to choices between technologies. 
Baseline Hazard Specification 
Mansfield hypothesized that information dissemination imperfections constrained 
adoption during the initial phase of adoption, but were slowly eliminated as the 
technology became more widely used.137  This led to the use of the ‘contagion’ or 
‘epidemic’ model to mimic the diffusion of information and adoption of a technology 
over time.   Duration analysis is a statistical technique that assumes a baseline hazard 
function, representing the dissemination of information and learning over time, and 
calculates the influence an independent variable beyond this baseline.  Because this 
technique was pioneered in the study of epidemiology, the terms (such as baseline 
hazard function, failure, etc.) refer to a patient contracting a disease.  In this analysis, 
the baseline hazard function refers to baseline information distribution, which flows 
among firms in the same way that a cold disseminates among people; and failure 
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means the firms adopts a specific technology, analogous to a person contracting a 
cold. 
The duration model structures used in this analysis are a combination of conventional 
proportional hazard frameworks and accelerated hazard frameworks.  In both 
frameworks, a specific hazard function is defined for assessing the probability of 
observing an event at time t, in this case adoption of a landfill gas project.  Dependent 
variables in the model alter the baseline hazard in a proportional or accelerated 
manner for all t for all landfills ‘at risk’ of adopting a landfill gas project.  In order to 
assess the most appropriate baseline hazard, I considered and tested a variety of 
baseline hazards.   
Kaplan-Meier Estimation 
The theory of technology diffusion assumes that the probability of failure (i.e., 
adoption of a technology) increases over time.  Evidence that adoption of landfill gas 
projects over time conform to this theory is seen in the Kaplan-Meier Survivor 
Function for the dataset (see figure 1 below) also shows a curved survival estimate, 
graphically demonstrated increased hazard over time.   
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In order to test the theoretical shape of the underlying distribution, I calculated five 
distributions using the full model including Cox, Weibull, Exponential, Log-Logistic, 
and Poisson. 
Hazard Function 
There are several underlying functions which can be used to specify the distribution 
of the hazard function.  The exponential form and the Weibull distribution are 
common in the limited literature on duration analysis in technology diffusion.  The 
exponential form means the hazard function is a constant.  This means that the 
conditional probability of a change (adoption) does not depend on the duration.138   
With the Weibull distribution, the hazard varies with the duration and the direction of 
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the dependence.  This distribution would be used if future duration spells are expected 
to change at a given point forward and are dependent on the duration of the spell.  For 
example, it may be useful to use the Weibull distribution if it is expected that a 
landfill that has not adopted a landfill gas project over the last ten years is less likely 
to do so because they have lost the ability to capture ten years worth of gas.   For 
descriptions of hazards functions, see chapter 3. 
Estimation Results 
The following table lists the estimated coefficients from the specified model for 
adoption of landfill gas projects.  I estimated the model using five different 
underlying hazard models in order to assess the most appropriate distribution for the 
underlying learning curve. 
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Table 4:  Model Results for Five Baseline Hazard Functions as Applied to the 
Adoption of Landfill Gas Projects 
 Cox Exponential Weibull Log-Logistic Poisson 
REPI 43040.3(0.991) 1.262(0.365) 0.776(0.343) 0.104(0.466) 0.735(0.000) 
NSPS 2.573(0.000) 1.633(0.000) 1.537(0.000) -0.235(0.000) 1.464(0.000) 
LMOP 1.952(0.001) 2.067(0.000) 1.849(0.001) -0.164(0.141) 1.593(0.000) 
      
RPS 1.735(0.001) 1.787(0.000) 1.514(0.008) -0.253(0.014) 1.255(0.000) 
Net Metering 0.493(0.000) 0.446(0.000) 0.482(0.000) 0.284(0.003) 0.502(0.000) 
Interconnection 
Standard 
1.256(0.226) 1.289(0.113) 1.073(0.669) 0.025(0.818) 1.042(0.402) 
Financial 
Instruments 
1.041(0.062) 1.036(0.075) 1.035(0.092) -0.014(0.229) 1.032(0.000) 
Ozone non-
attainment 
0.985(0.766) 1.015(0.762) 0.977(0.627) 0.017(0.556) 1.015(0.319) 
CO non-
attainment  
0.910(0.126) 0.937(0.243) 0.904(0.070) 0.064(0.127) 0.928(0.000) 
NO2  non-
attainment 
0.689(0.015) 0.684(0.013) 0.684(0.013) 0.193(0.013) 0.980(0.399) 
      
Electric Prices 1.109(0.021) 1.143(0.001) 1.202(0.000) -0.141(0.000) 1.115(0.000) 
Oil Prices 5.599(0.000) 0.992(0.316) 1.012(0.243) -0.015(0.002) 0.998(0.616) 
      
CA Dummy 1.669(0.004) 1.558(0.014) 1.617(0.011) -0.305(0.004) 2.214(0.000) 
Methane 
Potential 
1.348(0.000) 1.386(0.000) 1.424(0.000) -0.155(0.000) 1.162(0.000) 
Private 
Ownership 
1.148(0.159) 1.201(0.051) 1.221(0.039) -0.010(0.041) 1.127(0.000) 
      
Wald Test 245.5(0.000) 497.1(0.000) 293.1(0.000) 171.2(0.000)  
Goodness-of-
fit 
    10524.2(1.000) 
Shape 
Parameter 





Constant    4.953(0.000)  
Frailty test 1.000 1.000 0.280 1.000 n.a. 
Log Likelihood -2902.4366 -630.2776 -616.74104 -629.41868 -9944.12 
Coefficients are reported as hazard ratios, not the original hazard function 
coefficients, except for log logistic and Poisson. Hazard ratios greater than one 
corresponds to an increased probability of adoption relative to the hazard baseline.  
Hazard ratios less than one correspond to a decreased probability of adoption relative 
to the baseline.  A hazard ratio of one means there is not corresponding effect.  The 
log-logistic estimates are reported as coefficients, and Poisson estimates are reported 
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as incidence rate ratios.  The significance level is reported in the parentheses.  The 95 
percent confidence ratio is reported between brackets for the shape parameters p and 
gamma.  To estimate the frailty test for the Cox model, the data was grouped by state.   
Diagnostics 
Frailty 
One assumption I made when estimating an accelerated hazard model is that the 
underlying hazard distribution and explanatory variables account fully for differences 
among firms, i.e., there is no unobserved heterogeneity present.  If unobserved 
heterogeneity is present, estimates could be estimated incorrectly.  If relevant 
variables are missing from the equation, included variables coefficients are biased 
towards zero. 
In order to test for unobserved heterogeneity, I ran the model using a frailty model.  A 
frailty model incorporates an unmeasured “random” effect in the hazard function to 
account for the heterogeneity.139  The “random” effect follows a gamma distribution 
with a mean equal to one and a variance parameter of theta.   
The literature suggests, though no conclusive theorem currently exists, that data are 
more sensitive to the underlying hazard distribution than to that of the choice in 
underlying distribution of the added variable.140  I ran the models, therefore, using a 
gamma distribution in order to estimate the effect.  The tests were similar across the 
Weibull and Exponential distributions.  When the full models were tested for frailty, 
the test suggested there was a marginally significant problem of unobserved 
 
 74 
heterogeneity in the Weibull model.  The exponential, log logistic and Cox model test 
indicated frailty, though this may correspond to the data not fitting the hazard 
functions used in these models.  
 Heteroscadasticity 
In order to test for heteroscadasticity in the models, I ran the models estimating both 
robust and general estimates and compared.  In addition, I graphed the residuals of 
each model over time.  Neither test showed heteroscadasticity issues.  The robust 
estimates varied little from the general estimated model.     
 Test for proportional hazard 
A test for proportional hazards assumption shows that the proportional hazard in the 
Cox model is not constant over time.  Using the Scheonfeld residuals, I ran a test on 
individual variables as well as a global test to see if whether or not the variables 
interact with time.  The results of the test suggested that the data are multiplicative 
over time and is evidence that the Cox and exponential models are not appropriate for 
the trends seen in the dataset.   
 Shape parameter test  
I tested the shape parameter of the Weibull model against the exponential shape 
pattern.  Mathematically, the Weibull distribution is equivalent to the exponential 
distribution if the shape parameter is equal to 1. The shape parameter for the Weibull 
was significantly greater than one, indicating a Weibull distribution with an 
increasing hazard ratio over time was the best fit for the underlying data.  A shape 
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parameter between 0 and 1 for the log-logistic model suggests that Weibull is a better 
fit for the data. 
 Log Observed Outcomes vs. Time 
Graphical evidence for use of the Weibull model can be seen when graphing the log 
of the survival function against time.  The Weibull distribution implies that ln(-
ln(S(t)))), where S(t) is the survival function or underlying baseline hazard, is a linear 
function of time.   























Graphing the ln(-ln(S(t))) against ln(t) shows that the data does fit the Weibull 
distribution.    A Weibull distribution appears curvilinear in a plot of ln(S(t)) versus t, 
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but it is linear in a plot of ln(-ln(S(t))) versus ln(t).  An exponential distribution, on 
the other hand, would be linear in both plots and have a slope equal to 1 in the ln(t) 
plot.141 
Figure 3: Natural log of logged survival time over the log of time for Adoption of 

















Goodness-of-fit for the Poisson Distribution 
The goodness-of-fit tests, both the pseudo R2 and the Chi-squared test that the 
independent variables explain the outcome, show that the model is not a good fit for 
the data.  I rejected the Poisson distribution as a possible underlying distribution for 
the data.  This, along with the evidence from the other tests, seems to suggest that an 
accelerated time model is a more appropriate fit. 
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I rejected the possibility that the data does not “age” with time and the possibility that 
the data do not have an underlying parametric hazard baseline.  The exponential form 
is rejected because the Weibull results show that the shape parameter is not constant, 
but increasing.  The log logistic form is rejected because of the issues with frailty of 
the model and the fact that when the shape parameter for the log logistic equation is 
between 0 and 1, as is with this case, the shape of the log logistic distribution is very 
similar to that of the Weibull distribution.  The results of the diagnostic tests suggest 
that the Weibull distribution is the most appropriate underlying distribution for the 
data.   
Sensitivity of Results across Models 
A test of the sensitivity of the results is to look at the coefficients across all models.  
Most variables are consistently significant (or insignificant) across models.  The 
variables NSPS, RPS, net metering, CA dummy variable, methane potential, and 
electricity prices are all significant across all model types.  Interconnection Standards 
and ozone non-attainment areas are insignificant across all models. LMOP, nitrogen 
dioxide (NO2) non-attainment areas, financial instruments, and private ownership are 
significant across four of the five models.  REPI is insignificant in four of the models, 
and CO non-attainment areas and oil prices are insignificant in three of the models.  
The overall results from the models indicate that the Weibull model is the best fit for 
the data.  Using this model, I can state the following results about what influences 
adoption of landfill gas projects. 
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After the establishment of the LMOP program, the data suggests that landfills were 
85 percent more likely to adopt a project.  This is also reflected in interviews with the 
developers who praised LMOP for their work on information dissemination to state 
and local officials, smoothing the way for air permits and for general acceptance of 
projects at the State and local levels. 
The effect of the REPI incentive was not significantly different from the baseline 
hazard.  This is due to the uncertainty surrounding the Congressional appropriations.  
Even though the legislation was in place after 1993, the credit was not always fully 
funded each year.142  An electricity project might take advantage of additional 
revenue from the credit, but the project had to be cost-effective without the credit in 
order to survive.143 
After the implementation of NSPS, the data shows that landfills who fall under the 
NSPS rule were 54 percent more likely to adopt.  This fits with the theory that 
landfills are faced with a costly regulation to destroy the gas and are searching for a 
way to recover the cost of these projects by selling the gas or using it to create 
electricity. 
The presence of an RPS standard is significant in the Weibull model.  In states with 
RPS that includes LFG as a renewable, landfills are 51 percent more likely to adopt a 
landfill gas project.  This result fits with the fact that states find landfill gas projects 
cheaper relative to traditional renewable projects.    It also reflects to some extent the 
states attitudes towards promoting renewable energy in general. 
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Results for the presence of a net metering law suggests that competition with other 
producers, namely individual customers, reduces the likelihood of adoption by almost 
half.  I found in interviews with experts that companies occasionally have more 
difficulty negotiating electricity contracts with utilities that cover landfill gas project 
costs in states with net metering laws due to the fact the utility is already paying a 
specific rate for other individual consumers.  Also, utilities are only required by many 
states to purchase a fixed amount of electricity from outside of the utility.  Net 
metering laws may bias some utilities to buy the required amount from individual 
producers. 
Interconnection standards were not significant in the Weibull model.  Under the 
Federal law, PURPA requires that all utilities make standard power purchase 
contracts available to qualifying facilities less than 100kW. State interconnection 
standards provide a standardized agreement to connect with the utility.  Standard 
interconnection agreements tend to be based on technology instead of fuel type, so a 
limited number of landfill gas projects would qualify for the standard agreement.  
Interconnection standards may have more of an effect on technology choice as 
presented in the next chapter. 
Adoptions of projects at landfills which reside in counties in an ozone non-attainment 
area are no more likely than those in attainment areas. Landfills residing in a CO non-
attainment are 10 percent less likely to adopt.  This is due to states misperceptions 
about the technologies as cited by experts interviewed.  In reality, capturing landfill 
gas reduces ground level ozone and CO as it combusts NMVOCs.  Counties which 
are in NO2 non-attainment are also 32 percent less likely to adopt.  Burning methane 
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as a fuel is a source of NOx, and installing a generator in a non-attainment area 
requires the developer to endure a difficult permitting process. 
I found that state financial instruments had a slight, but significant affect on adoption.  
The experts I interviewed said that very few projects took advantage of State financial 
instruments.  A few cited the fact that the state financial instruments took a great deal 
of time to learn about and to process the paperwork through the state system.  As with 
State air permits, once a firm had learned how the process works, it was normally not 
applicable in the future as firms tend to work in different states.  While these 
instruments may help a single landfill gas project, they are may not be instrumental in 
diffusion of landfill gas projects. 
The dummy variable for landfills in California had a large effect on the outcome in 
the model.  The models suggest that a landfill in California is 62 percent more likely 
to adopt than one outside of the State.  Interviewers all mentioned California as being 
a completely different place to work than the rest of the country.  The 34 air districts 
made it more complicated to get the necessary permits to build a project, but the State 
and the attitudes of the population helped pushed projects forward. 
Private ownership of a landfill also had an effect on adoption.  The models suggest 
that privately owned landfills are 22 percent more likely to adopt.  This is expected 
since privately owned landfills tend to have more than one landfill, unlike publicly 
owned organizations; and they tend to reduce their information costs for each project 
adopted over time.  Once a private company demonstrates the usefulness of a project 
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or technology, it is easier for it to gain the internal financial support needed to 
replicate the project at another site. 
The size and potential for producing methane is also significant in the model.  An 
increase in size from one landfill size category to the next means the landfill is 
approximately 42 percent more likely to adopt a project.  This reflects the need for a 
steady, long-term stream of gas to fuel a project. 
For a one cent per kilowatt hour increase in the lagged state electricity price, a landfill 
was 20 percent more likely to adopt a landfill gas project.  Oil prices are not 
significant in the model, though they may have more influence in choice of 










Chapter 5:  Technology Choice 
In this section, the analysis focuses on the effect of State policies on technology 
choice for landfill gas projects.  My review of the literature found a few studies which 
relate Federal and State regulation, particularly environmental regulation on 
investment decisions.144 145 146  This analysis considers State level air pollution 
permitting and renewable energy policies influence when considering which 
technology is chosen by a landfill interested in utilizing landfill gas. 
Since Mansfield in 1961, numerous empirical studies have reviewed and analyzed 
industry-specific determinants of diffusion.147  Building on this body of research, 
others have analyzed a firm’s optimal adoption decision between two substitute 
technologies that are simultaneously available to the firm. 148 149  A small number of 
studies have focused on technology choice and environmental regulations or other 
policy variables using Logit analysis.150 
This section addresses determinants of diffusion of specific technologies, including 
policy variables, firm characteristics, prices, and learning-by-using as a foundation 
for understanding future adoption choices.  In addition, this analysis lays a foundation 
for better understanding spillover effects of technologies into the landfill sector, 
specifically new or niche technologies, and their rates of diffusion.  
My analysis seeks to investigate the determinants of successful adoption of specific 
capture-and-use technologies in the landfill gas sector by analyzing the landfill 
characteristics, policy influences, and price determinants behind adoption.  In 
addition to the determinants reviewed in the previous chapter, this chapter also 
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includes technology specific determinants such as the cost of the technology and NOx 
emission levels of each technology.  Again, the dependent variables of the model 
reflect lags in the adoption decision, in this case 2 years.  Using duration analysis, I 
determined the appropriate hazard function; and the results were analyzed by 
comparing the outcomes of the duration analysis to that of the interviews and 
literature review. 
The use of duration analysis allows for the distinction between duration dependence 
from calendar time dependence in the estimation of adoption probability.  Typically, 
duration dependence is interpreted as endogenous learn-by-using and flows of 
knowledge throughout the population.  This occurs in an epidemic pattern and is 
illustrated by the hazard function.  Calendar dependence is associated with the 
independent variables that change over the time period of the analysis. 
Model Specification 
The differences in technologies have important environmental and energy provision 
consequences.  Technologies vary in terms of electrical efficiency (amount of 
electricity produced per unit of fuel) and emissions of CO and NOx.  The stringency 
of air pollution regulations could influence the choice of technology a firm chooses.   
The technologies also vary in terms of energy provision; roughly half of the 
technologies used at landfills generate electricity either for the landfill or for 
provision to the grid, while the other half are a substitute for natural gas either in 
vehicles, industrial boilers, or other commercial applications.  Shortages or volatile 
prices of electricity vs. natural gas may play a key role in decision making. 
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Substantial differences in the types and numbers of technologies can be seen across 
states, indicating some State policy regimes may encourage certain types of 
technologies while other regimes do not.  The table below shows the variation in 
technologies across states.   
Table 5: Technology Variation by State  
(Summary table projects ever done by state as of 2006) 




Total Number of 
Projects 
AL Direct use; direct thermal; boiler; unknown 3 14 
AR High Btu; reciprocating engine; direct thermal 3 4 
AZ Steam engine; Stirling Engine; microturbine; 
reciprocating engine 
4 5 
CA Alternative vehicle fuel; boilers; cogeneration; 
combined cycle; direct thermal; gas turbine; 
Leachate treatment; liquefied natural gas; 
microturbine; reciprocating engine; steam 
engine 
11 112 
CO Reciprocating engine; direct thermal 2 4 
CT Reciprocating engine; fuel cell; gas turbine 3 4 
DE Reciprocating engine; steam engine; condensate 
evaporation 
3 4 
FL Leachate treatment; combined cycle; 
reciprocating engine; microturbine; boiler; 
direct thermal; steam engine 
7 27 
GA Direct thermal; reciprocating engine 2 11 
HI Cogeneration 1 1 
IA Direct thermal; reciprocating engine; steam 
engine 
3 5 
ID Leachate treatment; reciprocating engine 2 2 
IL Cogeneration; combined cycle; direct thermal; 
gas turbine; organic Rankine cycle; 
reciprocating engine; unknown direct 
7 42 
IN Reciprocating engine; direct thermal; Leachate 
treatment; microturbine; boiler; greenhouse; gas 
turbine 
7 25 
KS Direct thermal; high Btu; boiler 3 4 
KY Reciprocating engine; boiler 2 6 
LA Boiler; high Btu 2 4 
MA Fuel cell; gas turbine; direct thermal; steam 
engine; reciprocating engine; medium Btu 
6 25 
MD Reciprocating engine; boiler; Leachate; 
unknown direct use 
4 9 
MI Boiler; cogeneration; combined cycle; gas 
turbine; greenhouse; high Btu; Leachate 
treatment; reciprocating engine; Stirling engine 
9 42 
MN Reciprocating engine; combined cycle; Stirling 
engine 
3 8 
MO Direct thermal; boiler; Leachate treatment; 7 9 
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reciprocating engine; greenhouse; cogeneration; 
high Btu 
MS Boiler 1 1 
MT Leachate treatment 1 1 
NC Reciprocating engine; boiler; direct thermal; gas 
turbine 
4 23 
ND Boiler 1 1 
NE Reciprocating engine 1 2 
NH Reciprocating engine; Leachate treatment; gas 
turbine 
3 6 
NJ Boiler; cogeneration; combined cycle; gas 
turbine; greenhouse; LNG; medium Btu; 
reciprocating engine; steam engine 
9 28 
NM Microturbine 2 1 
NY Alternative vehicle fuel; cogeneration; direct 
thermal; gas turbine; high Btu; Leachate 
treatment; reciprocating engine 
7 41 
OH High Btu; reciprocating engine; combined 
cycle; microturbine; Leachate treatment; 
medium Btu; boiler; direct thermal 
8 24 
OK Direct thermal; alternate vehicle fuel; boiler 3 6 
OR Reciprocating engine; direct thermal; Leachate 
evaporation 
3 6 
PA Boiler; cogeneration; direct thermal; gas 
turbine; high Btu; Leachate treatment; 
reciprocating engine; steam engine; 
8 42 
RI Reciprocating engine 1 4 
SC Reciprocating engine; cogeneration; direct 
thermal; gas turbine 
4 8 
TN Reciprocating engine; boiler; Leachate 
treatment; high Btu 
4 10 
TX Reciprocating engine; direct thermal; organic 
Rankine cycle; cogeneration; Leachate 
treatment; boiler; high Btu; steam engine; gas 
turbine 
9 27 
UT Reciprocating engine; direct thermal 2 4 
VA Boiler; direct thermal; Leachate treatment; 
reciprocating engine 
4 27 
VT Reciprocating engine 1 5 
WA Reciprocating engine; Leachate treatment; gas 
turbine; boiler 
4 9 
WI Boiler; cogeneration; direct thermal; gas 




Landfill gas provides a low cost, renewable, local alternative fuel source for industry, 
hospitals, schools, and other institutions.  In addition, local utilities can participate in 
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landfill gas projects, take advantage of a renewable energy source, potentially 
improving customer relations and broadening their resource bases. 151 
Generally, experts agreed that they preferred the simplest technology possible.  This 
is substantiated by the sheer number of reciprocating engines and direct gas projects.  
They seemed to feel that the more complicated the technology, the less kilowatt hours 
(kWh) will be generated, even though the newer technologies tend to have less air 
pollution emissions.  What specific technology a developer will use also depends on 
what the landfill owner wants locally: whether or not there is a local buyer near by for 
direct use, or if the landfill itself would like to use some of the electricity the gas 
generates.152  
Different types of technologies were available at different periods during the analysis.  
As can be seen in the table below, boilers, reciprocating engines, gas engines, and 
direct use of the gas as high-Btu grade gas was available throughout the analysis 
period.  Newer technologies, such as fuel cells, were not considered viable options 
until after 2000. 
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Table 6: Number of Technologies Used over Time  
Type of Technology 1985 1995 2005 
Biodiesel/vehicle fuel 0 1 2 
Boiler 1 6 45 
Cogeneration 0 2 12 
Combined Cycle 0 2 6 
Leachate Evaporation 0 0 21 
Direct Thermal 0 7 37 
Fuel Cell 0 0 2 
Gas Turbine 2 16 26 
Greenhouse 0 1 4 
High Btu/ Liquefied 
Natural Gas 
1 4 14 
Medium Btu 0 0 1 
Microturbines 0 0 16 
Reciprocating Engine 15 76 254 
Steam engine/ Organic 
Rankine cycle 
0 7 20 
Sterling engine 0 0 1 
Note: this table lists only open projects in the given year. 
In the above table, the same landfill can have more than one technology running, 
based on how much each cell (or division of the landfill) produces.  As each cell is 
closed to additional waste, the gas for the well can be added to a current project or 
directed to a new project depending on the amount of gas produced by the cell and the 
size of the landfill gas project.  Larger landfills may have several projects that cover 
internal needs such as leachate treatment, as well as selling gas or electricity 
externally. 
The most common methane mitigation projects at landfills are electricity generation 
using a reciprocating internal combustion engine, directly piping landfill gas to an 
industrial boiler, or for use as direct thermal heat.  However, over the years, the 
diversity of projects has increased.   
The technologies in this analysis have been grouped into several categories; 
electricity generation technologies, direct use technologies, and niche technology 
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(less than 6 applications by 2005) are the major categories.  In addition, electricity 
generation was broken into reciprocating engines (which compose the majority of 
electricity generation projects) and other engines and turbines (Stirling engines, 
microturbines) which do not fit into the niche technologies category (like fuel cells).  
Categories could not be broken down further because of the difficulty of estimating 
the equations. 
The following technologies are considered in the analysis: 
• Reciprocating engines are commercially available and achieve high electrical 
and total efficiencies.  However, they have higher emissions than other 
engines, depending on catalyst/engine technology and maintenance.  They are 
a mature technology and are economically viable. 
• Stirling engines are lower in emissions and have high fuel flexibility (can 
easily use bio-fuels).  They also have the potential to achieve high total 
efficiency and moderate electrical efficiency.  They are low cost, but have 
only been introduced into the commercial market in the last five years. 
• Fuel cells are still in the research and development phase with demonstration 
projects currently under study.  Potentially, fuel cells offer the highest 
electrical efficiency and almost zero emissions, but questions remain about 
overall efficiency and costs once the technology is commercialized.   
• Gas Turbines are slightly more expensive than reciprocating engines and are 
also commercially available.  However, electrical efficiency is lower than the 
reciprocating engines.  NOx emissions tend to be lower with the gas turbine 
than with the reciprocating engine even without emission control 
technologies. 
• Microturbines are low emissions, but relatively higher cost when compared 
with reciprocating engines and gas turbines.  Only a small number of units are 
in commercial operation so reliability has not been fully assessed.  The 
potential is high because of the basic design and low number of moving parts,.  
Their electrical efficiency is comparable to that of a gas turbine. 
• The electrical efficiency of Steam turbines depends on the size of the plant, 
varying from a high compared to a reciprocating engine for a large plant to a 
low well below other turbines for a small plant.  Small sized team turbines 
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(less than 2MW) have a relatively small market and are not economically 
attractive in most cases.  Emissions are low relative to reciprocating engines. 
• Combined Cycle Systems have the potential to produce steam and electricity at 
higher efficiency rates and lower capital costs than traditional systems.  CC 
also has lower particulate and NOx emissions than traditional systems. 
• All of the above technologies can be combined into Cogeneration options 
were the total efficiency is based on electrical efficiency plus the efficiency of 
the condensing boiler. 
• Direct use projects include using the gas to heat greenhouses, using the gas as 
medium Btu fuel, cleaning the gas and using it as vehicle fuel, liquid natural 
gas or high Btu natural gas, using the gas in an industrial boiler or in a direct 
thermal heating system.  Emissions are similar across applications; however, 
they are dependent to some extent on the composition of the landfill gas and 
the cleaning process.  The cost of these applications largely depends on 
whether or not the fuel is processed before use and whether or not a pipeline is 
necessary to transport the fuel to the end user.   
• Some landfills use the landfill gas to power Leachate Treatment Systems 
onsite.  Raw leachate, which is the water that percolates through a landfill, can 
contain environmental hazardous materials such as heavy metals.  Leachate is 
created through a series of biological, physical, and chemical processes and 
must be treated to reverse these processes before the water can be put back 
into the environment.  This can be costly to a landfill.  In order to reduce these 
costs, some landfills use the landfill gas to combust the evaporated leachate 
using a flare. 
 
Electricity Generation 
EPA estimates that approximately 847 million metric tons of methane could be 
reduced cost-effectively (i.e., the revenue from selling energy covers the cost of 
installing the project from electricity generation and direct use projects.).  This 
reduction would mean a 20% decrease in emissions from US landfills.153  
Reciprocating internal combustion engines are cheap and appropriate for smaller 
sized landfills.  These engines generally produce between 1 and 3 megawatts (MW) 
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of electricity per project with costs ranging from 2 to 5 million dollars per project, 
respectively. 154   Electricity projects are the most likely to be effected by renewable 
energy policies, particularly RPS, net metering, and disclosure policies. 
Gas fueled turbines are the leading technology for new electric power generation in 
the US.  They have far lower greenhouse gas (GHG) and air pollution emissions per 
kWh than coal fired technologies.  Gas turbines are based originally on jet engines 
developed for the military.  Since the 1940s, military research and development has 
led to large improvements in design and significantly improved performance of the 
engines.   In the 1970s, the technology became cost-effective for use in the 
commercial power generation sector.  In the 1980s, reductions in production costs and 
low natural gas prices increased the diffusion of gas turbines from the electric utility 
sector in to the industrial sector.  At this time, industry and utilities began using 
cogeneration, utilizing the turbine exhaust as space heat.  In the late 1990s, 
microturbines were produced for off-grid and stand-by power generation.155 
Despite these advances, the reciprocating engine is by far the most popular choice for 
electricity generation projects.  In 2003, there were approximately 175 operational 
reciprocating engines installed and another 100 under construction or planned.  At the 
same time, only about 40 other types of projects existed, including microturbines, 
cogeneration, steam turbines, and gas turbines.156 
Waste Management, Inc., has been one of the leaders in electricity generation 
projects.  Their first project started in the mid-1980s, and they own and operate 30 
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landfill gas electricity plants in the U.S. which generated approximately 1.2 billion 
kWh of electricity in 2000.157 
Direct Use Projects 
Landfill gas can be directly used in boilers, as direct thermal heat, as medium or high 
Btu, or as liquefied natural gas.  In these cases, the landfill gas is piped directly to the 
nearby customer.  Customers beyond a five-mile radius are less attractive because the 
cost of a long pipeline is prohibitive.  Onsite, the gas can be used in a leachate 
evaporation system or as vehicle fuel for landfill trucks or fleet vehicles.  As natural 
gas prices have increased, landfill gas has become an attractive alternative.  This 
option, however, is more cost effective at larger landfills.  On average, a landfill with 
100,000 metric tons of waste-in-place can collect gas for direct use for approximately 
$55/Btu collected.  At a landfill with 11 million metric tons of waste-in-place, the 
cost drops to $1.35/Btu collected.158 
One example of a direct use project is with Lucent Technologies.  In Columbus, 
Ohio, the Beford landfill is supplying Lucent Technologies with landfill gas directly 
to a boiler system to generate steam for space heating and hot water.  The 20-year 
fuel contract began in 1992; and the gas is sold through SBM Energy, a landfill gas 
developer.  The cost of the landfill gas is approximately 10 to 20 percent less than the 
market price of natural gas.  Lucent Technologies estimates that the projects save the 
company $100,000 per year on fuel costs.  The landfill gas project is estimated to 
reduce 162,000 tons of carbon equivalent in greenhouse gases per year, equal to 




The Niche Technologies category includes a variety of technologies which have been 
tried at less than 6 sites.  These include applications that are more specific to landfill 
gas, such as purifying the gas to create liquid natural gas, as well as new technologies 
like fuel cells which are general to small, natural gas applications and still in the 
demonstration phase. 
In the last decade, considerable efforts have been made to further develop 
technologies such as fuel cells and microturbines for independent power production.  
State level financing and some net metering and interconnection standards target fuel 
cells and microturbines in order to encourage these technologies specifically. 
Fuel cells are one of the most promising examples of new technologies.  They are still 
in the demonstration phase, but to date have shown promising results.  For example, 
in a joint effort, the USEPA and ONSI Corporation developed a fuel cell project in 
Connecticut.  The project used a new gas cleanup technology to allow LFG to be used 
as a fuel in high-efficiency, low-emission fuel cells.  Prior to development of the gas 
cleanup technology designed and used in this project, use of landfill gas to power fuel 
cells was not possible due to contaminants in the gas such as sulfur and halides. 
USEPA and ONSI Corporation demonstrated the gas cleaning technology and fuel 
cell project at the Flanders Road Landfill.  The demonstration project was 
encouraging.  The fuel cell currently provides 140 kilowatts of electricity to the 
Connecticut Light and Power Company.160 
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NOx Emissions from Technologies Using Landfill Gas 
The independent variables are the same as in Chapter 4 with one addition; a NOx 
emissions variable by technology.  The new variable is considered in the literature 
and by experts as a critical aspect to the decision making process.  Average NOx 
emissions were taken from the technology descriptions in various published 
documents in terms of lbs/MWh and used as an explanatory variable (See Chapter 4 
for variable specification details).  In the direct use model and the reciprocating 
engine model, NOx emissions variable were not considered.  This is because both 
variables have the same value over time for all observations, causing problems with 
estimation and providing no added value to the understanding of the decision process. 
As in Chapter 4, cost of each technology was considered and rejected as an 
explanatory variable.  It is important to remember that all landfills in this sample are 
roughly cost-effective based on pre-feasibility studies.  Experts’ state that the revenue 
generated from the project relative to that cost was more important than the overall 
cost of the project.  If revenues, in this case based on oil and electricity prices, are 
high enough, the project is cost-effective.  Therefore, for this data set, specific 
estimates of relative costs between projects are not as important in choosing which 
technology to implement as the revenue stream.  For example, high oil prices in the 





I plotted the proportion of landfills which have not adopted a specific technology. 
Figures 4 and 5 compare the survivor function of direct use and electricity generation 
at an aggregate level.  They show higher survivor rates (no-adoption) for niche 
technologies.  In other words, fewer niche projects have been installed. 




















Notice that while the number of direct use projects is increasing, as shown by the 
slightly downward line of the KM curve, the slope of the curve is fairly flat indicating 
that direct use adoption is not increasing at the same rate as overall adoptions.  This 
can also be seen in the KM estimation for the electricity projects.  Compared to the 
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downward slope of direct use projects, adoptions of electricity projects are increasing 
at a faster rate. 






















I estimate each technology group separately and then compare them to the overall 
adoption estimates in Chapter 4.  In table 7, all results are reported in terms of hazard 
ratios with the significance of each in parentheses. 
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Table 7: Duration Analysis Results for Technology Choice Models  










REPI 0.648(0.009) 3.116(0.047) 0.631(0.142) 0.665(0.419) 0.515(0.825) 
NSPS 0.934(0.331) 1.236 (0.368) 1.287(0.101) 0.807(0.397) 0.261(0.203) 
LMOP 1.250(0.105) 0.633(0.233) 2.464(0.000) 2.143(0.066) 2.099(0.774) 
      
RPS 1.248(0.041) 0.241(0.003) 1.667(0.027) 1.737(0.176) 2.136(0.343) 
Net Metering 0.765(0.044) 1.351(0.322) 0.619(0.022) 0.521(0.116) 0.387(0.417) 
Interconnection 
Standard 
1.269(0.075) 0.714(0.302) 0.742(0.228) 2.594(0.011) 2.318(0.297) 
Financial 
Instruments 
0.985(0.455) 1.125(0.002) 0.974(0.443) 0.918(0.322) 1.018(0.908) 
Ozone non-
attainment 
0.954(0.165) 0.716(0.006) 0.984(0.828) 0.950(0.650) 1.008(0.977) 
CO non-
attainment  
0.919(0.089) 1.049(0.821) 0.877(0.087) 0.782(0.074) 0.986(0.973) 
NO2  non-
attainment 
0.824(0.149) 1.014(0.961) 0.700(0.059) 0.017(0.000) 0.025(0.000) 
      
Electric Prices 1.098(0.000) 1.049(0.549) 1.203(0.002) 1.275(0.018) 1.061(0.833) 
Oil  Prices 0.994(0.312) 1.052(0.015) 1.003(0.832) 0.948(0.022) 1.061(0.511) 
      
Methane 
Potential 
1.058(0.221) 1.827(0.000) 1.058(0.314) 1.250(0.046) 0.940(0.880) 
Private 
Ownership 
1.120(0.158) 0.463(0.000) 1.727(0.000) 1.648(0.109) 0.752(0.735) 
CA Dummy 1.560(0.002) 0.195(0.026) 2.555(0.000) 2.012(0.117) 0.497(0.628) 




3.728(0.000)   0.249(0.000) 0.189(0.000) 













Wald Test 534.9(0.000) 101.9(0.000) 112.4(0.000) 2015.6(0.000) 1369.4(0.000) 
Baseline 
Hazard 
Weibull Weibull Weibull Exponential Weibull 
Frailty test 0.001 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log Likelihood 368.69498 -276.07584 -551.89132 -94.108408 -28.475295 
 
Diagnostics 
All models underwent the same diagnostic tests as in Chapter 4 to confirm the use of 
the Weibull distribution, check for unobserved heterogeneity in the landfills, and 





None of the models except the direct use model showed signs of frailty.  However, 
when I ran the direct use model with gamma frailty, the hazard ratios did not change 
for any of the variables and the significance level of the variables changed little.  
None of the variables I considered significant in the original model were insignificant 
in the frailty model, and none of the insignificant variables became significant in the 
frail model.   
A significant probability that frailty exists in the direct use model suggests that a 
variable has been left out of the equation.  According to experts interviewed, this is 
most likely the availability of a near-by customer for the gas.  Many developers have 
commented that when evaluating a project, one of the first steps is to drive around a 
landfill and look for industrial plants.  In order for direct use projects to be cost-
effective, pipelines must be less than 20 miles long, but data on the availability of 
direct use consumer in close proximity to the landfill is not available and cannot be 
added to the model. 
 Heteroscadasticity 
In order to test for heteroscadasticity in the models, I ran the models estimating both 
robust and general estimates and compared them.  In addition, the residuals of each 
model were graphed over time.  Neither test showed heteroscadasticity issues.  The 
robust estimates varied little from the general estimated model.    
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 Shape parameter test  
I tested the shape parameter of the Weibull models against the exponential shape 
pattern.  Mathematically, the Weibull distribution is equivalent to the exponential 
distribution if the shape parameter is equal to 1. The shape parameter for the electric 
generation, direct use, reciprocating engines and niche technologies is significantly 
greater than one, indicating a Weibull distribution with an increasing hazard ratio 
over time is a good fit for the underlying data.   For the non-reciprocating engines and 
turbines, the shape parameter is less than one. For this study, I re-estimated the model 
using the exponential hazard function.  The results are reported in the table above.  
 Log Observed Outcomes vs. Time 
Graphical evidence for use of the Weibull model can be seen when graphing the log 
of the survival function against time.  The Weibull distribution implies that ln(-
ln(S(t)))), where S(t) is the survival function or underlying baseline hazard, is a linear 
function of time.  In the graph below, which graphs the ln(-ln(S(t)))) for non-
reciprocating engines and turbines, is consistent with the Weibull distribution graphed 
in Chapter 4. 
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Graphing the ln(-ln(S(t))) against ln(t) shows that the non-reciprocating engines and 
turbines data does fit the Weibull distribution as well as the adoption date shown in 
Chapter 4.    The date plotted above is more linear than the adoption data.  A Weibull 
distribution appears curvilinear in a plot of ln(S(t)) versus t, but is linear in a plot of 
ln(-ln(S(t))) versus ln(t).  An exponential distribution, on the other hand, is linear in 
both plots and has a slope equal to 1 in the ln(t) plot.162 This would seem to support a 





Figure 7:  Natural log of logged survival time over the log of time for Adoption 
















Results by Technology 
 Adoption of Electricity Projects 
In the electricity generation model, I found that 8 of the 16 variables considered are 
significant.  Unlike the adoption model in Chapter 4, the REPI variable is significant 
in the model and suggests that projects were less likely to occur with these incentives, 
35 percent less likely.  When I compared these results to the results of the direct use 
projects, a clearer picture emerges.  REPI credits were variable at best.  Whether or 
not the credit was available in a given year depended on that year's appropriation bill 
in Congress.  Electricity projects, which are more expensive than direct use and are 
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more likely to need the extra income to be cost-effective, could not rely on the credits 
to provide them with sufficient revenue.  Therefore, REPI had a negative effect on 
electricity projects, creating an incentive for developers to build direct use projects 
instead. 
In states with an RPS standard covering LFG projects, the adoption of an electricity 
generation project was 25 percent more likely than in states without an RPS standard 
or with one that did not include landfill gas.  Adopting an electricity generation 
project was 24 percent less likely states with net metering laws.  This is likely due to 
increased competition from individual producers of electricity in states with net 
metering laws.  Interconnection standards are significant with a 27 percent increased 
likelihood of adoption of an electricity project in states with the standard. 
Landfills which reside in counties which are in CO non-attainment areas are 8 percent 
less likely to adopt an electricity project as the state air quality standard becomes 
more stringent.  The inclusion of a significant dummy variable for California showed 
that California tends to encourage electricity generation, perhaps due to its’ high 
electricity demand.  Landfills in California were 56 percent more likely to adopt 
electricity projects. 
Higher electricity prices also meant increased adoption of electricity projects.  A 
1cent/kW increase meant landfills were 10 percent more likely to adopt an electricity 
project.  NOx emissions from specific technologies also had an effect on choosing 
electricity generation.   High emission engines were almost 4 times more likely to be 
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adopted by landfills.  This may be due to the significantly higher cost of low emission 
options. 
 Direct Use Projects 
Eight of the sixteen variables were significant in the direct use model.  In contrast to 
the adoption model in Chapter 4, the REPI incentive is significant.  The REPI results 
showed that landfills were approximately 3 times more likely to adopt a direct use 
project under the REPI incentive regime over an electricity project, holding all other 
variables constant.  As discussed above, the issue is that these credits were not 
reliable and were subject to appropriation bills.163  Because the credit could not be 
counted on to help fund a relatively more expensive electricity generation project, 
developers looking at a project site were more likely to go with a direct use project.164 
The RPS variable was also found significant; it showed that the presence of an RPS in 
the state meant a landfill was 76 percent less likely to adopt a direct use project.  RPS 
standards apply to the generation of electricity.  When comparing this result to the 
electricity generation model, the presence of an RPS rule steers projects toward 
electricity generation and away from direct use.   
O3 non-attainment areas decreased the likelihood of a direct use project by 28 percent, 
most likely because the gas is not combusted at the landfill, directly destroying the 
NMVOCs.  CO and NOx non-attainment variables are not significant, probably due 
to the fact that the gas in a direct use project is being sold for combustion by another 
firm.  In most cases, this firm is already combusting a comparable amount of fossil 
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fuels.  Therefore, there is no net gain in air pollution from the project.  State financial 
incentives for landfills increased the likelihood of a direct use project by 13 percent.   
Privately owned landfills and landfills located in California are less likely to adopt a 
direct use project.  Privately owned companies have more knowledge and experience 
in operating and maintaining electricity generation systems and are not intimidated by 
these technologies.  The demand in California for electricity is strong and encourages 
projects to generate electricity over direct use.  Increased size of the landfill, which 
translates into increased and long-term gas flow, increases the likelihood of adopting 
a direct gas use project by 83 percent. 
Many direct use projects have contracts with the end user based on the price of oil, 
not natural gas.  A one dollar increase in the price of a barrel of oil increased the 
likelihood of a direct use project by 5 percent. 
The results of the direct use model must be used with caution, however.  The test for 
frailty showed that it is a strong likelihood that a variable is omitted.  One variable 
that experts mentioned as crucial to a project is whether or not there was an end-user 
willing to buy the gas in the vicinity of the landfill.  This is nearly impossible to add 
to the analysis and, therefore, biases the analysis. 
 Reciprocating Engines 
I found that participation in the LMOP program made landfills two and a half times 
as likely to adopt reciprocating engines, and the presence of an RPS standard 
increases the likelihood of adoption by 67 percent.  The data also suggests that the 
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presence of net metering laws made a landfill less likely to adopt a reciprocating 
engine.   
Landfills in a CO non-attainment area were 12 percent less likely to adopt a 
reciprocating engine in states with less stringent permitting requirements.  Landfills in 
a NO2 non-attainment area were 30 percent less likely to adopt a reciprocating engine 
as standards became more rigid. 
California has a large number of reciprocating engines, and private ownership and 
intra-firm diffusion of knowledge seems to encourage the use of reciprocating 
engines.  Electricity prices influences the adoption of reciprocating engines.  A 1 
cent/kWh increase in average State price meant a landfill was 20 percent more likely 
to adopt a reciprocating engine.   
 Others Engines and Turbines 
Reciprocating engines are by far the dominant electricity generation technology used 
at landfills.  The choice of using other mature electric generation technologies is 
studied in the model for other engines and turbines.   Participation in the LMOP 
program doubled the likelihood of adoption of a non-reciprocating engine or turbine.   
The presence of an interconnection standard in the state made it more than twice as 
likely a landfill would adopt one of these technologies.  This may be due to the fact 
that interconnection standards, which in many cases are focused on specific 
technologies such as turbines and Stirling engines, would help ease negotiations with 
utilities when using technologies that deviate from the typical reciprocating engine. 
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A landfill in a CO non-attainment area is 22 percent less likely to adopt a non-
reciprocating engine or turbine.  NO2 non-attainment in a county meant that a landfill 
was 98 percent less likely to adopt one of these technologies most likely due to the 
fact that the NOx emissions have not been thoroughly tested for all of these 
technologies.  Increased methane generation potential increases the likelihood a non-
reciprocating engine would be adopted by 25 percent.   
A 1 cent/kWh increase in average State price means a landfill was 28 percent more 
likely to adopt a non-reciprocating engine or turbine. A 1$ per barrel increase in the 
oil price decreases the likelihood of adoption by 5 percent. This likely reflects the fact 
that an increase in the oil price would increase the cost of a project to an end-user 
based on a contracted rate pegged to the oil price.  These projects relative to direct 
use and reciprocating engines have smaller profit margins and are more sensitive to 
increased costs to the end user.  An increase of 1lb/MWh of NOx emissions from the 
technology mean the technology are 74 percent less likely to be adopted.   
 Niche Technologies 
Only two variables are significant in the model for niche technologies: NO2 non-
attainment and NOx emissions from the technology.  In areas with a non-attainment 
problem and strict standards for NO2, niche technologies are 97 percent less likely to 
be adopted.  This may be because emissions from these technologies are still untested 
or under studied, making it difficult to get permits.  For every increase in lb/MHz of 
emissions of the technology, a landfill is 81 percent less likely to use the technology.  
Several experts note that they generally used niche technologies because of their low 
emissions properties, in response to the permitting issues. 
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Chapter 6:  Turning State Policies into Federal Policies 
Introduction 
Over the last two to three years, more than thirty states have joined six regional 
initiatives to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from power plants and increase 
renewable energy generation.  These initiatives include the Western Regional Climate 
Action Initiative, the Powering the Plains initiative, the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
initiative (RGGI), the Western Governors’ Association (WGA) Clean and Diversified 
Energy Initiative, East Coast Governors’ Global Warming Initiative,  New England 
Governors Climate Change Action Plan, and the Southwest Climate Change 
Initiative.  As with many other environmental issues, the states in these regional 
initiatives are providing the basis for what may become a Federal system. 
The 110th Congress has proposed over 125 different climate related bills and a record 
number of cap-and-trade policies since its change over to Democratic leadership.165  
Representative Lover (D-MA) and Senators Lieberman (I-CT), Feinstein (D-CA), and 
Kerry (D-MA) have all proposed separate cap-and-trade legislation during the 110th 
Congress.  In addition to the climate change policies debated in Congress, the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005 focused on increasing renewable energy in the U.S.  Under the 
Act, the Federal government is required to increase the purchase of renewable power 
from 3% in 2007 to 7.5% in 2013.166  This goal is on the lower end of the State RPS 
goals.167  During this debate, Congress also considered enacting a Federal RPS, but 
that was later cut from the bill.  In addition to the increase in renewable power 
purchased by the Federal government, the Energy Policy Act also extended REPI 
credit of 1.9 cents per kWh for the first ten years of operation of a renewable project.   
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Other congressional concerns have focused on promoting energy independence or 
energy security by proposing ways of encouraging alternative fuels (biomass, 
biofuels, coal-to-liquid fuels, etc.).  The 110th congress introduced 7 bills focused on 
providing incentives to develop and use alternatives to foreign oil.168 
Encouraging landfill gas projects as a climate change reduction strategy or renewable 
energy promotion strategy has been considered for over a decade.  Federal policies 
provide tax credits as an incentive to adopt these projects, though funding has been 
insufficient to make significant changes.  NSPS provides a regulation scheme to 
encourage projects, which I argue in this study, is successful in encouraging LFG 
projects.  Other options have also been considered.  In terms of promoting renewable 
energy, one option that was discussed in several of the Energy Bill debates is a 
Federal RPS standard.  Options focused on reducing climate change include using 
landfill gas capture-and-use projects as a potential “offset” to a CO2 cap-and-trade 
regime or taxing carbon, which would increase energy prices and lead to large 
increases in revenue for landfill gas projects.  In Chapter 4 and 5, I point out that RPS 
and increased revenue through energy prices have been significantly large influences 
on adoption and technology choice.  Building on this information, the analyses in this 
chapter look at which of these schemes is more potent in influencing adoption. 
Climate Change Reduction Policies 
Environmental groups and economists advocate the use of offset under a cap-and-
trade program for CO2 as a way to reduce the cost of reductions to a power generator.  
A cap-and-trade system would allow the government to set an environmental target (a 
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cap on greenhouse gas emissions) and then use the market to determine the price of 
compliance.  A tax on carbon, another commonly discussed policy option, could be 
adjusted to meet an environmental goal over time; but it would not allow utilities to 
seek reductions outside their industry, which would reduce the short-term cost of the 
policy.  Non-market policy options also exist.  Two options which could be 
implemented are a best available control technology (BACT) standard or an energy 
efficiency standard.  A BACT standard is difficult to implement when technologies 
such as carbon capture and storage are still in the development stages.  Industry 
would prefer to choose for themselves which technologies are best for their 
operations, whether the technologies reduce emissions at the end-of-the-pipe or 
improve efficiency.  One of the main advantages of a cap-and-trade policy is the 
ability of a firm to by offsets or reductions from a firm that is not being capped.  
Offsets are generally reductions from industries producing non-CO2 greenhouse gases 
and are not covered by the cap-and-trade program.  Because the reductions are of 
non-CO2 greenhouse gases, a ton of reduction can be equivalent to 20 to 20,000 tons 
of carbon dioxide, depending on the gas and the gases GWP.  In addition, several of 
the gases, including sulfur hexafluoride (SF6) and CH4, have a market value and can 
be captured and sold as a way to offset all or most of the cost of reduction.  Since 
there is no market for CO2 in the quality and quantity that is being released from a 
power plant, CO2 reductions do not have a way to generate revenue through capture-
and-use.  Lastly, technology currently exists to reduce these emissions.  Industries 
emitting these gases need a price signal to make further reductions.  For these 
reasons, offsets are generally cheaper to implement. 
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However, offsets present a baseline definitional issue.  Under a cap-and-trade 
program, there is a target level of CO2 reductions.  If part of these reductions are met 
through offsets of another gas (e.g., reductions of CH4 at a landfill), how can the 
agency monitoring the program or the company purchasing the offsets be sure that 
these reductions are “real” and would not have happened in absence of the cap-and-
trade program?  This is generally referred to as a question of additionality - whether 
or not the reductions are additional to a business-as-usual baseline.   
Timing of the reductions becomes a crucial aspect of this question.  Diffusion theory 
states that just because a technology is cost effective to implement does not mean that 
the technology is instantly diffused.  I have confirmed this for the landfill gas industry 
in this thesis.  Given a future climate policy and the current diffusion of technologies 
over time, what is the actual baseline five or ten years from now?  Like any 
prediction, additionality can only be estimated.  Some have argued that it does not 
matter; any reduction is beneficial whether it is additional or not.  Others are 
concerned that without a way to monitor additionality, the target becomes less 
stringent and will not meet the environmental goals related to stopping further climate 
change. 
The question becomes, “Is the additionality issue large enough to design a complex 
system of bureaucratic investigation (i.e. a financial analysis of whether or not the 
project would be cost effective without the carbon credits) by the governing agency in 
charge of the cap-and-trade system, or is it minor and should be ignored?”   
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Offset policies are potentially tricky to implement.  The major concern about an offset 
policy is that it will count “anyway tons" towards an emissions cap.  In other words, 
reductions that would have happened “anyway,” without the pollution policy will be 
applied to the goal, reducing the reductions beyond the business-as-usual baseline.  In 
order to analyze this issue, the analyses in this chapter will look at proposed non-
climate legislation, in this case a Federal RPS policy, and compare it to reductions in 
the business as usual case and the pollution scenario where revenues are higher. 
Landfill Gas as an Alternative Fuel Source 
In addition to pollution and climate change concerns, states have promoted renewable 
energy for a variety of other reasons.  RPS debates at the State level have mainly 
focused on the energy interest of the State; pollution and climate change benefits are 
deemed an important, but secondary, benefit in many cases.  Some states are 
concerned about electricity supply and reliability and use RPS to diversify their fuel 
supply.  Some states are frustrated with the sharp increase in natural gas prices in the 
last five years and want to promote alternatives.  Some states are concerned with air 
emissions from coal-burning and use RPS to diversify.  States have used RPS to 
compliment other programs such as tax credits, grants, and cheap loans that 
encourage specific renewable technologies. 
The US seems to be moving towards a de facto National RPS as more and more states 
adopt it as a standard.  Currently 30 states have RPS with RPS goals ranging from a 
4% target in 2009 to a 25% target by 2025.169  Several environmental groups have 
advocated for a Federal RPS to compliment or replace the fluctuating and uncertain 
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Federal production tax credit.  RPS could also compliment a future cap-and-trade 
scheme if designed to appropriately take into account credit for early action and 
additionality issues.     
Post-Estimation Analyses for Parametric Models 
Using the estimated models in Chapter 4 and 5, the influence of additional policies or 
energy price increases on adoption (i.e., failure) can be predicted.170  Predictions can 
be made using the mean or median values of the independent variables which are not 
directly analyzed and can be made using either the time to failure or the logged time 
to failure.  This analysis will focus on changes in a specific variable or set of 
variables, using the mean value of the remaining variables, and predicting the time to 
failure. 
The expected value of time Tj, the time to failure for a random observation with 
covariates xj is given by: 
E(Tj|xj) = ∫0
∞ tf(t|xj) dt 
 = ∫0
∞ S(t|xj) dt 
where f() is the probability density function of T and S() is the survivor function.  
Both of these equations are reliant on the chosen hazard function for the model.  
Using Weibull as the example, the survivor function becomes: 
S(t|xj) = exp[-{exp(-β0 – xjβj) t}
p] 
It follows that the probability that a landfill will adopt at time Tj given xj is 
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F(t|xj) =1- exp[-{exp(-β0 – xjβj) t}
p] 
This estimation provides the mean value of the covariates.  In order to analyze the 
change in predicted outcome based on a change in one covariate, the covariate’s value 
can be changed, while using mean values for the remaining covariates.  This way, the 
vector of covariates xj can be modified to look at the influence of one or more 
variables on the survivor function.   
Post-estimation of the Diffusion Model 
Based on the empirical analysis presented in Chapter 4, the rate of adoption can be 
analyzed given various policy scenarios.  First, the analysis estimates the difference 
between no RPS standards, the current RPS standards, and a Federal RPS standard.   
Second, the analysis compares current policies to a Federal RPS and a potential 
revenue increase from a domestic cap-and-trade system that uses CH4 from the 
landfill sector as an offset to reductions in CO2 or a carbon tax scheme which 
increases domestic electricity prices and oil prices. 
Federal RPS Analysis 
In order to simulate a Federal RPS in the model, I ran the model for RPS=1 for all 
states.  All other variables were represented by their mean values in the model.  The 
mean value for the RPS covariate is 0.0784902.  This value is used as the business-as-
usual baseline for these analyses. 
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Figure 8: Current RPS standards in place vs. Federal RPS standards  
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Note that this figure is a representation of the survivor function, or the percentage of 
landfills which do not adopt landfill gas projects.  To calculate the percentage or 
number in the sample which do, the failure rate or adoption rate is simply 1-
survivorship.   
As can be seen in the Figure 8, a domestic RPS standard would increase adoption 
over a 25 year timeframe from about 40 to slightly above 50 percent.  If you compare 
this to today's electricity and oil prices, the sharp increase in energy prices since 2003 
(the end year of the analysis) increases adoption of projects beyond the predicted 
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adoption rate of a Federal RPS.171  The combination of increased energy prices and a 
Federal RPS yields the steepest curve indicating the fastest rate of diffusion.  
Climate Change Reduction Policy Analysis 
As can be seen above, the critical factor in promoting landfill gas projects is the 
increase in the electricity price or oil price (i.e., revenue).  This can be accomplished 
through a market-based climate change policy such as a cap-and-trade program or 
through a carbon tax scheme.  The revenue from increased energy prices under a tax 
scheme or the increased energy price plus the revenue earned from companies buying 
the offsets would determine the rate of adoption of landfill gas projects.  RPS would 
open up a market to sell the energy by forcing utilities to buy electricity from LFG 
projects.   
To look at the effect of a carbon price on diffusion of landfill gas projects, I selected a 
range of carbon prices and added the carbon price to the current energy price.  Table 
8 below summarizes the energy prices at $10, $25, $50, $100 and $200 per ton of 
carbon.  In this analysis, there is no difference between a carbon tax scheme and a 
cap-and-trade program.  Both policies increase the energy price in the model. 
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Table 8: Energy Prices Associated with Various Levels of Potential Carbon 
Prices172 
Carbon Price Additional Cost Due to 
Carbon Price  
($/barrel for oil; cents/kWh 
for electricity) 
Carbon Price plus Current 
Energy Price ($/barrel for oil; 
cents/kWh for electricity) 
$10/ton of Carbon - Oil  $28.61 $121.98 
$10/ton of Carbon - Electricity  ¢0.39 ¢7.89 
$25/ton of Carbon - Oil  $71.53 $164.90 
$25/ton of Carbon - Electricity  ¢0.96 ¢8.46 
$50/ton of Carbon - Oil  $143.05 $236.42 
$50/ton of Carbon - Electricity  ¢1.925 ¢9.43 
$100/ton of Carbon - Oil  $286.10 $379.47 
$100/ton of Carbon - Electricity  ¢3.85 ¢11.35 
$200/ton of Carbon - Oil  $572.20 $665.57 
$200/ton of Carbon - Electricity  ¢7.7 ¢15.2 
 
The effect of a range of carbon prices on the diffusion rate of landfill gas projects can 
be seen in Figure 9 below.  The analysis shows that at $25 per ton of carbon, all 
candidate landfills would adopt a project over the next 25 years.  At $100 per ton of 
carbon, the rate of diffusion increases to full adoption in approximately 7 years.    
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Figure 10 below is the same analysis, but includes a Federal RPS.  As can be seen in 
the graph, the combined carbon price and Federal RPS accelerates the rate of 
diffusion.  However, the acceleration is limited to a few years.  At $25 per ton, full 
adoption occurs at roughly 24 years instead of 25 years.  At $100 per ton of carbon, 
full adoption occurs at roughly 5 years instead of 7 years. 
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The level of the carbon price has a dramatic effect on the rate of diffusion in the 
analysis.  In order to compare this to a potential climate change policy, one that could 
realistically be promulgated, I reviewed potential cap-and-trade schemes which have 
been introduced into Congress and choose the Lieberman-McCain Climate 
Stewardship Act of 2003 as a basis of comparison.  While this bill is not among those 
currently debated on the Hill, it is similar to seven currently proposed bills and has 
the advantage of being widely analyzed by the Federal government, think tanks, and 
Universities.  The results of these analyses are published and available to the public.  
The currently proposed bills have been analyzed to various extents by the Federal 
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government, but the results have not been published.  The Climate Stewardship Act is 
also considered the model for many of the State programs now being considered 
including the REGGI program.   
A range of potential costs from the Climate Stewardship Act are available from 
reports from the National Resource Development Council, MIT University, and 
USDOE's Energy Information Agency.  Below is a summary of the carbon prices 
from each of these analyses. 
Table 9:  Cost of the Leiberman-McCain Climate Stewardship Act 
$/ton of Carbon 
 NRDC MIT EIA 
2010 29 62 79 
2015 66 81 119 
2020 81 103 178 
Source: Pew Climate Center 
NRDC and EIA both represent biased positions on the issue, giving a range of costs.  
The most unbiased estimate from a policy agenda perspective is the MIT estimate, 
which, as expected, lies somewhere in between the two extremes.  In order to analyze 
these costs in the duration models used in this thesis, I converted the MIT cost 
estimates to energy prices based on the carbon content of coal used to generate 
electricity and oil.173 Using the conversion methodology recommended by the UN 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change to estimate emissions from energy, I 
could estimate the amount of carbon per unit of energy. 174  Building on this, the price 
per unit of carbon can then be converted to price per unit of energy.175  Using these 
conversions, the carbon prices from 2010 in the MIT analysis roughly translates into a 
2.4 cents/kWh and 177.38 dollars per barrel increase in energy prices.     
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In figure 11, the survivorship function or predicted non-adoption of the business-as-
usual scenario (where RPS equals the mean), a Federal RPS standard, a climate 
change policy, and a climate change policy with a Federal RPS standard is compared.  
In this analysis, the RPS standard was assumed to cover all states.  The energy prices 
increased to 9.9 cents/kWh and $270.75/barrel of oil for electricity and oil prices, 
respectively.  These prices reflect the current energy price as of November 15, 2007, 
plus revenue from a carbon price and the national average oil price per barrel for 
November 15, 2007, plus revenue from a carbon price. 
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The model shows the strong response of the industry to increases in energy prices.  
The response is much stronger than creating a Federal RPS standard of similar 
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strength to the current State standards.   The analysis also shows that the additionality 
problem relative to the overall increase is small, approximately 10 percent.  
Compared to the RPS standard, the increase in energy prices due to a cap-and-trade or 
tax scheme will increase adoption of landfill gas projects to the point where all 
landfills that have projects that are technically feasible will adopt in 14 years.  A 
combination of a Federal RPS standard and cap-and-trade program will speed up 
adoption, and all technically feasible projects will be implemented in approximately 
12 years. 
From the analysis it can be seen that the RPS standard coupled with higher revenue 
from the climate change policy gives the most reductions in the shortest period of 
time.  This argues for ignoring the additionality issue and concentrating on more 
overall reductions of CH4. 
Post-estimation of the Electricity Projects Adoption Model 
Another potential policy goal in the renewable energy and climate change arenas is to 
ease the demand on coal, if only slightly, buy using alternative fuels to create 
electricity.  While using landfill gas is in no way a "magic bullet" to solve this 
problem, it can contribute to a solution.  This analysis looks at effective policy 
options to maximize the use of landfill gas to generate electricity.  Note that when 
looking at an electricity project, tradeoffs between electricity generation projects and 
direct use projects are taken into account.     
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with average energy prices and with current energy prices




Figure 12 illustrates the effect of a national RPS program on adoption of electricity 
prices.  Electricity projects increase from 85 to 90 percent of overall adopted projects 
with current energy prices or with a Federal RPS.  The combination of the current 
energy prices and a Federal RPS increased adoption to approximately 95 percent over 




Figure 13: Comparison of Federal RPS and the Climate Stewardship Act in the 
















































Federal RPS vs. the Climate Stewardship Act
 
 
Figure 13 shows the same overall pattern as the adoption model as electricity projects 
make up the majority of projects adopted overall.  A combination of a Federal RPS 
and climate change program pushes this to almost 100 percent of all adoptions being 
electricity projects in 25 years, a few percentage points above a climate-change-only 
regime. 
Post-estimation of the Direct Use Adoption Model 
When looking at the rate of adoption of direct use projects, a Federal RPS and cap-
and-trade scheme combined would be less effective in encouraging direct use projects 
than a climate change policy alone.    RPS skews the distribution of technologies 
towards electricity generation projects, away from direct use.  This leads to the 
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Federal RPS standard increasing the number of electricity projects.  However, the 
increased energy prices continue to make some direct use project attractive in the 
short term.   
















































with average energy prices and with current energy prices
Current RPS vs. Federal RPS
 
 
Compared to figure 12, figure 14 shows an opposite trend in direct use projects under 
a Federal RPS program.  Direct use projects decrease from approximately 5 percent 
of total adoptions under the current RPS regime to a total of approximately 2 percent 
of all adopted projects under a Federal RPS.  The current oil price makes direct use 
projects dramatically more attractive.  Approximately 90 percent of candidate 
landfills would adopt direct use projects over the 25 year period at the current oil 
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price.  If  a moderate price increase is combined with a Federal RPS standard, the  
adoption rates of direct use projects is restricted; and landfills adopt electricity 
projects. 
Figure 15: Comparison of a Federal RPS and the Climate Stewardship Act in 
















































Federal RPS vs. the Climate Stewardship Act
 
 
As can be seen in figure 15, a combination of RPS and carbon price will have little 
effect because the oil price is sufficiently high to diffuse direct use projects almost 
immediately.   
Post-estimation of the Niche Technologies Adoption Model 
Niche technologies are not significantly affected by either policy, although the 
number of niche applications continues to increase.  Concerns about NOx emissions 
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continue to drive adoption of these technologies.  The experts I interviewed noted that 
while energy prices were not currently high enough to make a difference in choosing 
niche technologies over more mature technologies, under a potential future cap-and-
trade program, they expected this to change.  The basic niche technology model does 
not reflect this because this phenomenon (high enough energy prices to cover the cost 
of niche technologies) cannot be found in the historical data.  Despite the inability of 
the historical data to estimate this trend, it is expected that higher energy prices will 
lead to a steady if not increasing use of niche technologies.  A Federal RPS standard 





Chapter 7: Summary and Conclusions 
I began this analysis to answer whether or not State renewable energy portfolio 
standards influenced the adoption of landfill gas projects.  It is important to learn 
from the experience of the RPS programs and use this experience to design an 
optimal policy at the national level to address climate change and renewable energy 
issues.   
Did RPS increase the rate of diffusion? 
This analysis confirms the explanatory power of the independent variables 
traditionally considered in the literature on diffusion.  By far, the most influential 
State policy was the RPS standard.  Experts gave the relevance of a renewable 
portfolio standard a mixed review.  While a few of the experts indicated that RPS 
standards kept projects going during the years when Federal incentives were 
uncertain or unavailable, others felt that the RPS credits were too unreliable to count 
on as part of the basic economics of a project.  Some noted that as time goes on, 
issues with the RPS standards are working themselves out; and they felt that in the 
future strict RPS standards could help promote projects.  However, the modeling 
exercise showed that RPS rules already have a more significant affect on adoption 
than the experts perceived them to have.  As the stringency of RPS increases over 
time, it is likely that RPS will increase diffusion rates. 
In other areas, experts, the literature and the modeling agreed.  For example, states 
with low emission standards and non-attainment areas have difficult permitting 
procedures and push companies towards more expensive projects with lower profits.  
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Developers seem to shy away from projects in NOx and CO non-attainment areas 
because of the additional NOx and CO emissions from the projects.  Despite this, 
companies will go through the sometimes lengthy process of obtaining the permits, if 
a project is deemed profitable enough to justify a more expensive, cleaner technology.  
This is shown in the modeling by a hazard ratio of less than one, indicating that in 
states with non-attainment issues and low air standards it is less likely a project will 
be adopted.  Permitting in ozone non-attainment areas were either not an issue or the 
perception was they did not apply to landfill gas projects. 
The literature, particularly USDOE/EIA reports, stated that State provisions such as 
net metering and interconnection standards have had an impact on landfill gas 
projects.176  The statistical analysis and experts disagree.  Interconnection standards 
do not seem to have any influence on the development of landfill gas projects, and net 
metering actually seems to have a negative effect by encouraging utilities to find 
renewable sources of energy elsewhere.  The effect of net metering on discouraging 
LFG projects is a particularly interesting result.  These policies are designed to 
encourage renewable energy projects other than LFG, creating competition.  In terms 
of a national renewable energy goal or greenhouse gas reduction goal, these policies 
do not necessarily have a negative consequence overall.  More information on the 
success of these policies in encouraging residential and commercial solar or other 
renewable projects is needed to determine if these policies support national renewable 
and climate change goals. 
As expected, NSPS and energy prices have a positive effect on the diffusion of LFG 
projects.  NSPS encourages large landfills to switch to a capture-and-use project in 
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order to cover the cost of the regulation.  Increased energy prices mean projects are 
more profitable.  The results of the LMOP variable confirm the importance of 
information networks in the diffusion of technologies. 
Did State Renewable Portfolio Standards Influence Technology Choice at 
Landfill Gas Projects? 
State Renewable Portfolio Standards positively influenced the adoption of electricity 
projects, particularly reciprocating engine projects.  The standards had a negative 
impact on direct use projects, providing enough of an incentive to generate electricity 
that landfills shifted away from direct use projects in these states.   
The overall results of the technology models complement the results of the interviews 
and literature search, and further clarify the contradictory nature of the experts’ view 
s of RPS with the view of the literature.  Developers generally felt that RPS did not 
encourage LFG projects, noting that RPS projects would have been developed even 
without the RPS.  What the analysis of technical choice shows is that RPS may have 
provided the developer with an incentive to develop an electricity project over a 
direct use project.  At landfills with large amounts of gas available over several 
decades, the economics of a project looks good on paper but is useless unless a buyer 
can be found.  RPS creates a market for electricity sales, a critical factor in the 
decision to develop a project, particularly if there is not a nearby industrial park or 
institution nearby to buy the landfill gas directly. 
RPS did not encourage the use of innovative technologies nor did it promote 
demonstration of new technologies.  Instead, air pollution issues, specifically NOx 
emissions, were a strong factor in encouraging the use of innovative technologies.  
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Projects in NO2 non-attainment areas were less likely to be adopted.  Engines and 
turbine technologies with low NOx emissions, which have been introduced as an 
innovative substitute to a reciprocating engine, are more likely to be adopted in most 
cases.   
Another important result of the technical choice analysis was the influence of the 
REPI.  While REPI applies to electricity generation projects, the analysis shows it is 
insignificant in the electricity projects diffusion model.  In contrast, REPI is a 
significant and positive factor in the direct use diffusion model.  This result suggests 
that the lack of reliable funding for the incentive made it ineffective at promoting the 
targeted electricity generation projects; instead, it encouraged landfills to opt out of 
electricity generation and develop a direct use project.  Because REPI has been 
renewed under the latest energy bill, a thorough investigation of the usefulness of this 
policy should be conducted. 
Energy variables in the model are predictably related to the type of project; electricity 
projects were significantly influenced by electricity prices, and direct use projects 
were significantly influenced by oil prices.     
Is RPS a stringent enough policy to accelerate diffusion and meet climate change 
and renewable energy targets? 
Post-estimation analysis of the parametric models shows the hypothetical impact of a 
Federal RPS standard on adoption of landfill gas technologies overall, as well as 
diffusion of specific types of technologies.  While a nation-wide RPS standard can 
increase adoption by 10 percentage points overall, this could be a small increase 
compared to proposed climate change legislation or even a more modest increase in 
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energy prices.  RPS programs also skew what types of projects are adopted, since 
they apply only to electricity generation projects.   
Combining a Federal RPS standard with a market based climate change policy could 
have a beneficial effect in increasing overall diffusion of landfill gas technologies.  At 
lower carbon prices, combining a climate change policy with a Federal RPS will 
increase the diffusion rate of landfill gas technologies.  The number of direct use 
projects will continue to increase under this scheme, but at a lower rate than with a 
climate change only policy.  At higher carbon prices, RPS may not be needed to 
create a market for the electricity sales.  The lower price of producing electricity 
using LFG compared the high price of oil or natural gas under a climate change 
policy increases market share of electricity from LFG beyond the market mandated 
by current RPS. 
Recommendation for future studies 
My interviews with developers and landfill owners alone lead to the conclusion that 
RPS programs are only marginally successful at encouraging landfill gas projects.  
Developers interviewed felt that the price received for the electricity produced under 
the program was not high enough to pay for projects that were not profitable outside 
of the program.  The literature on RPS, mainly produced by State governments and 
environmental NGOs, reflects a different point of view.  Some NGOs are even 
concerned that the RPS programs go too far in encouraging landfill gas and should be 




The results of the analyses in this dissertation suggest several areas of research 
beyond the scope of this dissertation.  As mentioned previously, net metering policies 
and their success in encourage small scale renewable electricity generation should be 
studied in greater detail to provide more information about how these policies should 
fit into national renewable energy and climate goals.  Another policy that needs to be 
looked at in great detail is the success of the REPI in encouraging electricity 
generation projects.  This analysis suggests that it has not been successful in 
promoting electricity generation from LFG.  Because this is most likely due to the 
nature of the incentives funding process, other types of electricity generation projects 
may be similarly affected. 
Another area of interesting research is the role of attitudes and State government 
institutional structure on diffusion of environmental technologies.  In this analysis, 
California is seen as a significantly different culture in which to work than any other 
of the states because of the complicated State government structure (i.e., the 34 
separate air districts) and the innovative nature of the society.  An in-depth look at 
these issues would be informative in how other states could encourage the diffusion 
of environmental technologies.  
Lastly, the effect of green power provision in developing the market for renewable 
energy sales and the new Section 45 tax credit effect on encouraging LFG projects 
would be useful once the data becomes available.  Neither of these policies existed 
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Appendix A: Interview Coverage 
Developers, landfill owners/operators, experts and associations: 
o Companies formally interviewed represent 30 percent of the total 
projects over the time period of the study.   
o These companies have facilities in 41 states; these 41 states account for 
approximately 92% of all LFG Projects. 
Formal Structured Interviews States covered: 
Waste Management, Inc 
o Waste Management (owns and 
operates landfills and transfer 
stations) 
o Wheelabortor (development 
company under Waste 
Management) 
LFG Facilities owned by WM or 
partnership in CA, CT, FL, GA, IA, IL, 
IN, MI, MO, NH, NY, OH, OR, PA, TN, 
TX, WI  
WM sells LFG to third party facilities in 
FL, GA, IL, IN, KY, MA, MD, MI, MN, 
MS, NE, OH, SC, PA, TX, VA, WA 
 
Enerdyne, Inc NC, PA, VA 
Gas Recovery Systems (GRS), Inc. CA, HI, IL, IN, MA, MI, MN, NC, NY, 
TX, VA 
DTE Biomass Energy AL, AZ, CA, FL, IL, KS, MA, MI, NC, 
OH, OK, TX, UT  
  
National Partnerships Formally Interviewed: 
Landfill Methane Outreach Program, USEPA 
Solid Waste Association of North America  
  
Landfill Tours: Montgomery County Landfill, MD 
 Fairfax County Landfill, VA 
  
I would also like to thank representatives from the following companies who 
provided informal comments on my dissertation: 
AEA Technologies OWT, Inc. 







                                                                                                                                           
 
Appendix B: Summary Statistics for Observation Year 2003 
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Observation Year 1093 2003 0 2003 2003 
REPI 1093 1 0 0 1 
NSPS 1093 1.461116     .4987139          1 2 
LMOP 1093 13.16102     8.076311          0 27 
RPS rate 1093 .2241537     .3818242          0 3 
Dichotomous RPS 1093 .3641354     .4814072          0 1 
Net Metering 1093 .2854529     .4518366          0 1 
Interconnection 
Standard 
1093 .441903             .4968406 0 1 
Financial Instruments 
(number) 
1093 1.353156     2.115199          0 9 
Tax 1093 .1665142     .3727121          0 1 
Loan 1093 .0914913     .2884385          0 1 
Grants 1093 .2159195     .4116471          0 1 
Ozone county 
attainment*State target 
1093 .9835316     1.514794          0 4 
CO country 
attainment*State target 
1093 .2031107   .86386           0 4 
NO2 county 
attainment*State target 
1093 0 0 0 0 
Electricity Price 1085     5.355094     1.970603    2.966747    11.39855 
Oil Price 1093 27.56 0 27.56 27.56 
Landfill Name 1093     
County 1093     
State 1093     
Size 1076 2.405204     1.028583          1 7 
Precipitation 1093 .9423605     .2331672          0 1 
Methane Potential 1076     2.261152     1.153202          0 7 
Private Ownership 1065   .4544601 .4981557    0 1 
CA Dummy 1093 .116194            .3206041   0 1 
NOx Emissions by 
Technology 
550            2.143904    1.050719 .001 3.1 
Adoption 1093 .5068618             .5001818 0 1 
Electricity Projects 391 1 0 1 1 
Direct Use Projects 124 1 0 1 1 
Reciprocating Engine 
Projects 
289 1 0 1 1 
Non-Reciprocating 
Engine Projects 
102 1 0 1 1 
Niche Technology 
Projects 




                                                                                                                                           
 
Glossary 
Million Metric Tons 1,000,000 kilograms which is equivalent to 1 Tera gram 
Tera grams 10^12 grams which is equivalent to a Million Metric Ton 
Mega grams 10^6 grams 
    
Additionality 
The issue of whether or not a specific amount of reduction 
occurred because of a climate change policy (additional tons).  
If the reductions are not additional, or due to the climate 
change policy, in other words, they would have occurred 
anyway, there is an additionality issue. 
Anyway Tons 
Reductions that would occur without a climate change policy 
and should be considered in a business-as-usual baseline.   
Diffusion 
"the word diffusion is commonly used to describe the process 
by which individuals and firms in a society/economy adopt a 
new technology, or replace an older technology with a new 
technology." Hall, 2004 pg. 2 
Global Warming Potentials 
An index based on the heat trapping ability of a gas where 
CO2 is the reference and has a GWP of 1.  See table 2. 
Offsets 
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